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Abstract 
Lone wolf terrorism has received considerable media attention, yet this phenomenon has 
not been sufficiently examined in an academic study. National security officials must 
distinguish between terrorist activities carried out by lone wolves and those carried out by 
terrorist networks for effective intervention and potential prevention. The purpose of this 
qualitative study was to explore the phenomenon of the leaderless lone wolf terrorist and 
the underlying mechanisms and processes that lead individuals to be drawn to or away 
from an existing radical movement. The theoretical framework for this study was 
leaderless resistance theory. Secondary data from interviews, field notes, and surveys 
from the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base and the Global Terrorism Database 
were analyzed using open and selective coding. Findings revealed 3 individual-level 
underlying mechanisms and processes (personal and political grievance, risk and status 
seeking, unfreezing) that lead individuals to be drawn to or away from an existing radical 
movement and to act unilaterally without direction toward violent ends. Findings also 
indicated that no single typology fits all perpetrators. The findings benefit national 
security officials and intelligence agencies by identifying lone wolf individuals, weighing 
the actual threat versus the perception, developing better counterterrorism strategies for 
the lone wolf phenomenon, and enhancing relations with outside agencies. Results may 
improve understanding of lone wolf terrorism and may be used to develop new policies to 
predict and track future threats. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Transnational Terrorism, Security, and the Rule of Law (TTSRL, 2013) stated 
that 80% of lone wolf terrorism attacks in the United States have come from within. 
According to TTSRL (2013), lone wolf terrorism is more widespread in the United States 
than in other countries, with U.S. attacks representing about 42% of all lone wolf attacks. 
National security officials must distinguish between terrorist activities carried out by lone 
wolves and those carried out by terrorist networks. Identifying these threats is imperative. 
Lieberman and Collins (2011) pointed out that the role of national security is to provide 
direct contact with other government agencies to thwart the attacks. Lone wolf terrorism 
is countered through examination of key trends, dimensions, and features. Examples of 
lone wolf attacks in the United States included the following:  
• the 2013 bombing of the Boston marathon; 
• the 2013 Navy Yard shooting in Maryland; 
• the 2012 attempted suicide bombing of the U.S. Capital building; 
• the 2011 shooting of an Arizona congresswoman and her supporters; 
• the 2010 plane attack of an IRS building in Austin, Texas, by a tax protestor; 
• the 2010 botched car bomb in New York Times Square attempting to blow up 
the subway system; 
• the 2010 bomb plot in Dallas to blow up a former president’s house; 
• the 2009 shooting at Fort Hood by an army psychiatrist; 
• the 2009 shooting at the Little Rock, Arkansas, Army recruiting center by an 
Islamic militant; and 
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• the 2009 murder of a D.C. museum security officer by a man fascinated with 
Nazi Germany. 
To prepare and protect the public, the U.S. government made modifications to 
Section 206 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), known as the lone wolf 
provision (DeRosa, 2005). The modifications in Section 206 allowed the government to 
obtain judicial-instructed access to all things that are touchable, such as organizational 
files, in terrorist investigations. The stipulations increased access to documents that might 
be wanted and decreased the standard for a judicial official to give out a forceful 
command regarding their production (Lui, 2011). This modification was made because 
the behavior of a lone wolf terrorist is more difficult to detect apart from microcells (Lui, 
2011). There are fewer opportunities for lone wolf terrorists to be caught because they act 
individually when planning the attacks, making it difficult for national security or law 
enforcement officials to trace them (International Association of Chiefs of Police [IACP], 
2012). This is one of the reasons why national security officials and the intelligence 
community declared the lone wolf threat as one of the greatest to national security (IACP, 
2012). 
Many officials are concerned that something like 9/11 may occur again but on a 
larger scale. However, national security officials must also be concerned with smaller 
attacks by lone wolves (Carafano, 2011). National security officials must identify and 
thwart these attacks before they occur. However, if they do occur, officials must react 
quickly using coordinated efforts. One thing Congress can do is enhance reaction times; 
lone wolf terrorist attacks are ongoing, and national security must be ready at any 
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moment (Carafano, 2011). Also, Congress must continue to update the U.S. Patriot Act 
because that might be the most efficient way to deal with the threat before it happens 
(Carafano, 2011). Finally, Congress should make sure that all government agencies are 
working together for information-sharing purposes and partnerships, as each unit plays an 
integral role in protecting the nation (Carafano, 2011). Although every attack cannot be 
thwarted, this approach may be Congress’s best line of defense against terrorist attacks. 
Background 
The unique nature of these attacks requires lone wolves to act alone during an 
event, raising concerns among national security officials and citizens of the United States. 
Bergen and Hoffman (2010) stated that it is not costly for terrorists to carry out an attack. 
Carrying out an attack may cost only a few thousand dollars for an individual or 
microcell (Levitt, 2017). What is most frightening about this phenomenon is that it can be 
carried out swiftly, with minimum funding and preparation. (Bergen & Hoffman, 2010). 
Terrorist threats are ongoing, especially toward the West, and U.S. national security 
officials must enhance all security measures to thwart attacks. 
The capability among government agencies for sharing information and 
collaborating could enhance security measures when faced with a sudden attack. 
According to Bakker and DeGraaf (2011), counterterrorism operations need to be better 
equipped to detect lone wolf signals that indicate an individual’s intent to carry out a 
terrorist attack. This requires efficient information collection and utilization throughout 
the information management process, which usually goes through the intelligence 
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community production process. It also requires the intelligence community to work in 
partnerships with other agencies.  
Research has shown that lone wolf attacks are often botched because of 
operational mistakes. Lone wolves follow a process and are vulnerable during the 
planning period. For example, U.S. Army Pfc. Naser Jason Abdon was arrested on 
suspicion after he planned to attack a store near the Fort Hood military base in Texas. 
The attack was thwarted because of several operational mistakes he made (Coffey 2011). 
Jose Pimentel, a natural U.S. citizen, was caught with improvised explosive devices he 
planned on using in New York. This attack was hindered due to Pimentel making himself 
vulnerable to detection by way of his Internet activities (Coffey, 2011). National security 
officials and other government agencies must detect these mishaps during the lone wolf’s 
preparation phase and use every resource to capitalize on mistakes.  
Studies have shown that terrorists often follow a model set by their predecessors. 
Lone terrorists’ actions often mimic those of a group or individual, but they must 
improvise and/or scale down their method of attack because of unforeseen circumstances 
and conditions (Friedman, Harper, & Preble, 2010). This is the strategy national security 
officials must exploit to detect patterns established by prior terrorists. As their method of 
attacks change and evolve due to unforeseen circumstances and conditions, national 
security officials must also adjust their method of detection (McClure, 2013). In 1994, 
intelligence efforts for security officials were revised in New York by Police 
Commissioner William Bratton. The revisions reduced violent and serious crime in New 
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York by 80%, and New York is now considered one of the safest large cities in the 
United States (Albrecht, 2011).  
Revisions continue to have a significant impact, even with the additional 
counterterrorism methods that have been implemented since 9/11 (Albrecht, 2011). 
Tikuisis (2009) provided statistics on U.S. states that are prone to terrorist attacks. States 
that are smaller and weaker are more likely to experience violent terrorist attacks than 
stronger states by a 3:1 factor. This ratio increases to 5:1 when considering states’ 
dislodgement of residents, individual protests, fiscal changes, and security mechanisms. 
Weaker states with moderate fiscal and social growth performances are more likely to 
experience terrorist attacks compared to other weaker states (Tikuisis, 2009). 
National security relationships with other agencies play a significant role in filling 
the gaps to protect U.S. citizens. In principle, national security officials should refine 
their priorities and methods, share a collective vision between all agencies, define roles 
and duties within those agencies so communication is more effective, offer a rational 
model for congressional oversight, and communicate their intent to the people at home 
and overseas (Dale, 2013). Congress has carried out efforts, primarily through 
proceedings, to obtain a better understanding of the landscape of terrorism in many states 
and to measure the efforts of partnering agencies. Congress examined several platforms 
and procedures regarding national peacekeeping efforts; connections between 
transnational crime, drugs, and terrorism financing; and the link between homeland and 
transnational terrorism events (Painter, 2013).  
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Miller (2013) stated that changes in the last decade have been messy and sparse; 
these changes have focused on an agency rather than the shared goal of all, and other 
changes should be made. U.S. national security agencies seem to be lacking the skills 
needed to communicate with others outside of their realm. Communication and sharing 
should be an essential function of national security, but this function seems to have been 
totally abandoned as reflected in sparse reforms (Miller, 2013).  
The lone wolf threat is a concern to national security and the people of the United 
States. The modern security landscape requires a detailed and resolute approach to 
detecting and thwarting terrorist attacks (Valentin-Bogdan, 2013). This study provided a 
better understanding of the factors that influence lone wolf terrorists to act violently. The 
leaderless resistance model was the basis for examining the threat and dispelling the 
mystique. The model provided a theoretical approach to address concerns related to lone 
wolves. 
Problem Statement 
The problem addressed in this study was that lone wolf terrorism has received 
considerable media attention, yet this phenomenon has not been sufficiently examined in 
an academic study. FBI Director Robert Mueller (2003) reported that lone wolf terrorists 
are the most difficult to identify before they act, and therefore pose a huge security 
concern. Research regarding lone wolf terrorism has been limited (Arndt, 2011). 
Traditionally, terrorism has been examined as a group activity, and scholars have focused 
on group aspects and group socialization to explain individual pathways to terrorism 
(Spaaij, 2010). Early research on lone wolf terrorism came from creeds of anarchist, 
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including a review of unexpectedly scarce theoretical writings on the topic in English 
(Feldman, 2013). The lone wolf problem was present 150 years ago, but now has become 
a ubiquitous feature of western political and counterterrorism dialogue in recent years. 
(Feldman, 2013). The lone wolf problem became evident when Theodore Kaczynski 
acted outside of an established terrorist hierarchy, killing three individuals and injuring 
23 others (Phillips, 2011). Lone wolf terrorists have since been taking advantage of 
national security lapses. Although the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act included 
provisions to protect against lone wolf threats, there is a need to understand the 
underlying mechanisms and processes of the lone wolf. National security officials remain 
concerned about the endurance of established terrorist hierarchies, but new trends point to 
the increase of attacks by individuals and/or microcells who have very little, if any, 
contact with established terrorist hierarchies (Michael, 2012).  
The lone wolf terrorist’s ideology manifests in terrorist or radical actions. 
National security officials and the FBI are aware of these manifestations but will not 
formally list them as established terrorist hierarchies in the United States. Lone wolf 
terrorists include individuals who act on their beliefs to support animal rights, the 
environment, anarchism, White superiority, Black independence, anti-government, and 
abortion. Since 9/11, lone wolf terrorists have been responsible for carrying out several 
dozen attacks, and there seems to be an increase in the number of hate groups present 
nationwide. Most of the hate groups’ acts seem to be focused on the government 
(Bjelopera, 2012). A cohesive approach is needed to protect U.S. citizens (Dale, 2013).  
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This problem is significant, and it invokes a sense of fear and dread. Lone wolf 
terrorists act alone and have no constraints regarding violence levels. They are 
unconcerned about what national security does before or after an attack, and prefer to 
isolate their supporters. When they act alone, they are much harder to detect because no 
other individual is aware of their intentions. Downing and Mayer (2013) asserted that 
lone wolves are more dangerous than established terrorist hierarchies. There have been at 
least 60 plots, 49 of which have been homegrown (Downing & Mayer, 2013). Individuals 
or microcells are naturalized citizens, lawful permanent inhabitants, or guests.  
The lack of cohesive communication among agencies has made it more difficult 
for national security officials to detect lone wolves. The minimal literature on the lone 
wolf phenomenon had made it difficult to understand the characteristics of lone wolves 
and how they translate ideology into practice. This qualitative study addressed this gap 
concerning lone wolves using secondary data analysis. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to focus on the lone wolf phenomenon apart from 
other types of political violence and terrorism using the RAND-MIPT Terrorism 
Knowledge Base and the Global Terrorism Database. Using the leaderless resistance 
theory, this study was qualitative in nature and focused on the leaderless lone wolf 
terrorist phenomenon including the underlying mechanisms and processes that lead 
individuals to be drawn to or away from an existing radical movement and act 
unilaterally without direction toward violent ends. The literature provided insight into 
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lone wolf terrorism and the changes that need to be made to address the security concern 
through secondary data analysis. 
Nature of the Study 
The qualitative method was used to assess the lack of understanding of the 
leaderless lone wolf terrorist phenomenon including the underlying mechanisms and 
processes that lead individuals to be drawn to or away from an existing radical movement 
(TTSRL, 2008). Conducting qualitative research was a way to identify intangible factors, 
such as social norms, socioeconomic status, gender roles, ethnicity, and religion, whose 
role in the research may not be clear (see Creswell, 2009).  
Research indicated that the process of self-radicalization of lone wolf terrorists 
remains misunderstood and warrants further scientific research (Christensen, 2004). 
Phillips (2011) discussed how understanding the individualistic nature of lone wolf 
terrorism might require more subtlety from several economic-theoretical models that may 
lend themselves to its analysis. Building on previous research, I used a qualitative 
phenomenological design to explore the threat of lone wolves. Lone wolves follow a 
pattern and are susceptible to exposure at some point in the process. Identifying this 
process was essential to addressing the problem posed by these individuals (Bjelopera, 
2012). 
Research Questions 
There are two types of research questions: central questions and sub questions. 
Central questions are designed to explore the concept of the study or the central 
phenomenon. Sub questions separate the central question into a relevant question 
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(Creswell, 2009). The central research question in this study was as follows: What are the 
underlying mechanisms and processes that lead individuals to be drawn to or away from 
an existing radical movement and to act unilaterally and without direction toward violent 
ends? The sub questions (SQs) for this study were as follows: 
SQ1: What causes an individual to participate in lone wolf terrorism? 
SQ2: Are there consistent and significant indicators that can characterize a 
potential lone wolf actor? 
Theoretical Framework 
The framework used to guide this study was the leaderless resistance theory. 
Essential to the leaderless resistance theory is the method of resistance that motivates 
individuals or microcells to undertake acts of political violence separate from an 
established hierarchy (Joosse, 2007). The relevance of this theory to this study was 
ideological inclusiveness that leaderless resistance advocates. Although leaderless 
resistance is used to avoid detection, ideological inclusiveness can be an advantage for 
individuals involved in groups, such as the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), because of what 
leaderless resistance advocates (Joosse, 2007).  
According to Gruenewald, Chermak, and Freilich (2013), little is known about the 
nature of lone wolves and how everyone comes to this conclusion of violence. Once 
agencies understand lone wolves’ characteristics and how they form their ideological 
mindset, they will be able to collaborate to develop solutions, such as detecting the threat 
and identifying individuals before their beliefs transforms into actions.  
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Miller (2013) indicated that national security officials lack a cohesive tactical 
planning model. The model national security uses are somewhat outdated and is not an 
effective method of communication. Regarding national security, the intelligence 
community focuses on the overall issue of terrorism and takes a reactive approach instead 
of being proactive (Coaffee & Rodgers, 2008). National security’s structure and methods 
are more than 60 years old and are not relevant to address the most recent security 
concerns. The anxiety that U.S. citizens have been experiencing since 9/11 is calling for a 
change in the system and communication methods of the national security apparatus 
(Miller, 2013). 
Leaderless terrorists do not follow the traditional methods of an established 
terrorist hierarchy given the nature of their independence and fluid movements (Gray, 
2013). The leaderless resistance theory assisted in exploring the motivational factors for 
ideological resistance by an individual rather than by leaders from an established terrorist 
hierarchy. This theory assumes that oppositional entities, such as the U.S. government, 
are problematic to individuals’ survival, and therefore lone wolf terrorists use tactics to 
oppose the entities. Although the tactics of a lone wolf vary depending upon the 
circumstances and conditions, Dale (2013) indicated that leaderless resistance theory is 
suitable for examining the characteristics, ideology, and threats to national security of 
lone wolves in the United States. Leaderless resistance theory became important because 
lone wolf terrorists like Joseph Paul Franklin and Ted Kaczynski were very discreet and 
went years without being caught (Martinez, 2012). National security concerns are easier 
to comprehend using leaderless resistance theory, and the concerns regarding lone wolf 
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terrorism in United States are better understood when considering the factors that make 
up the phenomenon. 
Operational Terms 
While conducting this research, I used many operational terms. The operational 
terms and theoretical meanings relevant to study ensue.  
Established terrorist hierarchy: Terrorist covert groups that organize along 
similar lines of a terrorist organization (Anti-Defamation League, 2013).  
FISA Act: “The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 prescribes 
procedures for requesting judicial authorization for electronic surveillance and physical 
search of persons engaged in espionage or international terrorism against the United 
States on behalf of a foreign power” (Margulies, 2013, p. 7).  
Leaderless resistance theory: Political Research Associates (2013) stated that 
leaderless resistance or phantom cells generally refer to spontaneous, autonomous, 
unconnected cells seeking to carry out acts of violence, sabotage, or terrorism against a 
government or occupying military force. 
Lone wolf terrorist: Andrews (2009) states that a “lone wolf terrorist is a person 
who performs terrorism without direct orders or connections to any organization” (p. 1).  
National security: National security is the obligation to preserve the survival of 
the country by way of financial control, mediation, and political command (Sitek, 2013). 
Phenomenon: “A fact or situation that is observed to exist or happen, esp. one 
whose cause or explanation is in question” (Stampnitzky, 2013). 
13 
 
RAND Terrorism Database: RAND Corporation has established and maintained a 
database of terrorism events dating back to 1968, which contains comprehensive 
information on international and domestic terrorism. Initially, RAND collected lone 
incidents of international terrorism but started collecting and registering data on domestic 
terror attacks in 1998 (RAND Terrorism Database [RTD], 2013).  
Self-radicalization: “A process by which an individual or group comes to adopt 
increasingly extreme political, social, or religious ideals and aspirations that (1) reject or 
undermine the status quo or reject and/or undermine contemporary ideas and expressions 
of freedom of choice” (FBI, 2013, p. 4). 
Assumptions 
There were four assumptions related to this study: (a) I assumed that reexamining 
existing data to understand findings from new perspectives would have value; (b) I also 
assumed that collecting data on lone wolf individuals from selected databases would 
require organizational approval due to sensitive information; (c) furthermore, I assumed 
that prioritizing a concept or issue that was relevant in the original data may not be 
relevant at the time of the current study; and (d) last, I assumed that the available data 
were collected openly and ethically. 
Limitations 
One limitation of this study was the term terrorism. Terrorism is subject to 
varying interpretations and perspectives: states, organizations, agencies, and individuals 
define the term differently. Further, the problem of terrorism as it exists today defies the 
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boundaries of historical jurisdictions. Additionally, this study was limited by the 
challenges inherent in the reuse of qualitative data. 
Scope and Delimitations 
This study was limited to lone wolf terrorism in the United States. Lone wolf 
terrorism outside of the United States was not considered. The database searches were 
limited to acts of lone wolves. Group terrorism was not addressed in this study. The 
rationale for this choice was that lone wolves formulate individual methods and strategies 
that are different from those used in an established terrorist organization. Databases are 
ideal for researching lone wolf acts, and many can be found on administration websites. 
Due to challenges that arose when I conducted database searches, websites such as the 
Department of Homeland Security and search engines such as Google Scholar were used 
in the study.  
Significance of the Study 
The significance of lone wolf threats was addressed in recent studies (Spaaij, 
2010). National security readiness enables agencies to collaborate to detect the lone wolf 
threat. Although there is no common vision among agencies regarding the concept of 
national security, many associates it with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
and conventional military interaction (Dale, 2013). The purpose of the study was to 
examine the lone wolf phenomenon apart from other types of political violence and 
terrorism. The term lone wolf terrorism referred to terrorist activities carried out by 
individuals separate from those carried out by terrorist networks. Qualitative data were 
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analyzed to identify the characteristics of lone wolf terrorists and formulate a base of 
knowledge for lone wolf terrorism. 
Contributions to the base of knowledge included information addressing national 
security’s concerns regarding terrorism threats and vulnerabilities. The exploratory 
research design allowed me to examine the lone wolf phenomenon separate from the 
group phenomenon. In addition, exploration of the psychological factors that influence 
the lone wolf to act violently could help the United States develop stronger security 
plans. According to the White House (2013), the President’s top concerns are keeping 
Americans safe, making sure that U.S. values and ideas are preserved, securing the 
country against current threats, fending off terrorist attacks, and allocating more 
resources for stronger reaction and rebound capabilities.  
Furthermore, the federal government and all other agencies should work together 
as close partners in a national approach. Brooks (2011) maintained that an enormous 
amount of work is required by Congress. The American people may need to be willing to 
pay for more security by giving up certain civil liberties.  
Lone wolves are vulnerable to detection during the process of planning and 
executing the act. Many love wolves are unskilled and lack the knowledge, assets, and 
training necessary to carry out the violent act. Although the Internet is a guide for 
conducting attacks and making weapons, such as bombs, it cannot substitute for hands-on 
experience training in the real world. For these reasons, many lone wolves will at some 
point step out of their comfort zone (Bakker & de Graaf, 2010) and be identified or 
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arrested before they can conduct an attack. To deter lone wolf attacks, national security 
should take a collaborative approach: 
National security officials and many other agencies across the federal 
government, local and private sectors, local communities across the nation, and 
overseas have worked hard since the 9/11 attacks to make this country better and 
to alleviate and safeguard it against evolving threats, to lessen the risks, and 
expand the capacity to react and rebound from attacks. (DHS, 2013)  
A determined effort is needed to secure the United States from lone wolf terrorism while 
protecting the basic liberties of citizens. Though threats remain, the United States is more 
powerful now than before 9/11 and is better equipped to address evolving threats (DHS, 
2013). 
Implications for Social Change 
There were four implications for social change because of this study. First, 
findings may be used to inform the people about decreasing recognition than increasing 
an environment of fear that threatens an aptitude of social cohesion. According to the 
Lammers and Hickson (2013), social cohesion and synchronization are necessary to hold 
people together in times of an emergency. A second implication for social change was to 
present data on how the lack of approach to reducing this threat sends a message that 
social cohesion is not important. A better understanding of lone wolf terrorism could help 
the American people work together to mitigate the threat. A third implication for social 
change was to improve communication about U.S. values. Fourth, reducing fear and 
uncertainty about national security was is valuable long-term implication for positive 
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social change. All the above-mentioned implications should foster social change for 
national security and all intelligence agencies. The people of this nation can withstand 
great progress and advances in the ways national security services are supplied on top of 
improving national security reputation with all other agencies and the citizens of this 
country. Likewise, Americans may become more informed toward the existing situation 
and more doctrinally vested in the process. 
Summary 
The results of this qualitative secondary analysis study may improve 
understanding of lone wolves’ characteristics. National security officials should adopt a 
more cohesive approach to engage with other agencies to develop strategies to address 
national security threats. Currently, the national security approach lacks cohesiveness and 
overlooks the responsiveness of other federal and local agencies during an emergency or 
terrorist attack. Changes to national security policy are needed to address the ongoing 
threats of lone wolf terrorism. Chapter 2 provides a review of literature pertaining to lone 
wolf terrorism, national security preparedness, and reasons why national security officials 
are concerned.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The leaderless resistance theory illustrated that there is a lack of cohesiveness in 
the national security approach, and national security officials and other government 
entities should collaborate to develop strategies to address the growing threat of lone wolf 
terrorism (Alexander, 2009). The U.S. media promotes lone wolf terrorism by stressing 
fear and uncertainty despite a lack of examination of the lone wolf phenomenon. The 
purpose of this study was to explore the phenomenon apart from other types of political 
violence and terrorism using the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base and the 
Global Terrorism Database. This chapter is organized according to the themes that 
emerged during the literature review. The themes in the literature search stemmed from 
the theoretical framework of understanding the imbalance of power that manifests in lone 
wolves surfacing as terrorists or radical extremists (Michael, 2012). The research 
provided evidence of post-9/11 lone wolf terrorism in the United States, and the purpose 
of this study was to enhance the U.S. national security approach to deal with the future 
threats and attacks.  
This chapter starts with the definition of terrorism as an ongoing threat, followed 
by a review of existing literature and the gaps pertaining to lone wolf terrorism. The 
chapter also presents the leaderless resistance theory from the 1960s. In addition, I 
examine aspects of the phenomenon by assessing the practice, characteristics, and 
paradigm of the government’s approach. A cohesive approach to national security is 
presented that may help thwart threats and attacks. Chapter 2 concludes with the social 
change mechanism concerning homeland terrorism. 
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Lone Wolf: A Definition Melee 
One issue when conducting research on the nature of this phenomenon was the 
lack of a consistent definition. Terrorism has been defined in many ways, and there has 
been no universal definition that all scholars have accepted. Government officials, 
scholars, and other stakeholders use the term terrorism to illustrate different types of 
violence, thereby diluting the meaning (Spencer, 2006).  
Violent acts such as kidnapping, insurgent attacks, piracy, and guerilla warfare are 
considered terrorist attacks. However, there is uncertainty surrounding the multifaceted 
definition of terrorism, which is evident in the models used to detect it, and which is seen 
in the debates that take place in national security conferences (Rapin, 2011). If the United 
States and the international community could agree on a collective definition of 
terrorism, the exclusion clauses under the 1951 Geneva Convention would establish 
standards of international law comprising of terrorism (Simeon, 2010).  
The lack of a clear definition of this phenomenon has prompted many debates. 
According to Smyth (2009), a taped conversation with Letta Tayler, senior researcher of 
Human Rights Watch, indicated that government authorities have largely contested views 
on terrorism because no one knows exactly what it really is, and it is broadly defined. 
When questioned about the impact and results of the war on terror, Tayler (as cited in 
Smyth, 2009) stated that terrorism undercuts regulations, customs, and communal safety.  
Mazhar, Khan, and Goraya (2013) noted that terrorism can be defined as violent 
behavior that is motivated politically on behalf of individuals, groups, or states. The 
purpose of terrorism is to instill fear in the opposition and its population to influence 
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decisions and change their behaviors. A collective definition of terrorism is essential to 
any real fight on terrorism. A neutral definition should be founded on established 
international regulations and doctrines pertaining to the behaviors that are allowed in 
conventional wars among states (Boaz, 2010). The issue of trying to define the term has 
had a philosophical predisposition in the continuing melee (Acharya, 2008).  
More recently, Jackson (as cited in Stump, 2013) tried to rewrite the definition of 
terrorism, but not without major criticism. Critics pointed out that Jackson’s attempt to 
redefine terrorism was expressed from a closed-minded perspective that limited the 
capacity to logically study terrorism (Althied, 2006). Second, critics believed Jackson 
considered terrorism a type of bizarre violence, which has led some researchers to 
prejudge the phenomenon and overlook relevant and prominent features of terrorism. 
Critics said the way Jackson approached terrorism was not sufficient for terrorism studies 
and did not provide a systematic structure for researchers studying terrorism (Stump, 
2013). 
No matter the circumstance or event, nations and governments define terrorism 
from the perspective of their organizations. The definition used by the U.S. government 
describes terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents” (CIA, 2013, p. 1). 
Based on this definition, the language involving terrorist attacks are very similar. The 
only differing factor involves the location of the attack, which can include international 
or domestic. The understanding of terrorism is difficult for reasons other than the 
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definition. Since 9/11, characteristics of terrorism have changed. Studies have not only 
addressed the strategies, but have also addressed the characters involved (Gilly, 2013). 
Review of Literature 
The need to review the underlying mechanisms and processes that lead the lone 
wolf terrorist to be drawn to or away from an existing radical movement has far-reaching 
security concerns. The review of literature provided insight into lone wolf terrorism and 
the changes that need to be made to address the security concern. The DHS (2011) 
reported lone wolf terrorism to be the most prevalent threat domestically. In addition, 
Spaaij (2010) stated that the term lone wolf was given to White racists who used the 
tactic to bring about change. There is growing concern for national security to detect 
prospective terrorists and to prepare citizens from horrific terrorist events. National 
security officials should understand how these individuals think and operate to save lives 
and apprehend the individuals who may commit such acts. It is critical for the 
government and intelligence agencies to identify a pattern and expose lone wolf 
terrorists.  
Bates (2012) stated that the consequence of being unprepared leads to casualties 
and property destruction, which poses a security concern. Although effective security 
measures are in place, the development of leaderless resistance methods and tactics are 
facilitated through the advancement of technology (Bates, 2012). Terrorism comes in 
different forms and structures and the lone wolf terrorist has formed a personal and 
political impasse. Domestically, radical extremists cause a challenging and urgent threat 
to U.S. national security.  
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Lieberman and Collins (2011) assessed that the role of national security involves 
the Attorney General, the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, and direct coordination from the federal and local governments. It is very 
important for agencies to coordinate and use proper training during the investigative 
process. Legal ethics training aims to elude any violations of human rights and decisions 
that otherwise may violent civil freedoms. (Bryneilson et al., 2013). Many factors are 
involved when an individual decides to act alone or be a part of an established terrorist 
hierarchy (Nijboer, 2012).  
Stewart (2011) said it is very challenging to separate extremists who have every 
intention to commit terror acts oppose to those who just voice their opinion of hate. 
National security officials use unlimited resources and time searching for individuals who 
maybe transitioning their extreme beliefs into actions. This is a frightening assignment 
assuming the enormous number of potential suspects. Achieving this goal requires 
consistent engagement from communities and businesses, and it is important for everyone 
to do their part by reporting potential individuals to national security officials (Cooper, 
2012). 
Evidently, this has had some effect. The growing threats of lone wolf terrorism 
domestically has forced security officials to contend with the facts that radicalization 
develops here in the United States (Levitt, 2017). Barnes (2012) asserted that present 
security techniques focuses on the culpabilities and liabilities designed for group 
interactions, a deterrent method to terrorism that is unsuitable to the lone wolf terrorist. 
However, most lone wolves are unskilled and the act never fully develops. The same 
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characteristics that make lone wolves difficult to apprehend also reduces the damage that 
can be done (Barnes, 2012).  
Armed forces have minimized the terrorism threat from overseas (Barnes, 2012). 
The homeland threat has come from unidentified individuals who use violence to express 
their beliefs and opinions. Recently, domestic terrorism effects had been felt on April 15, 
2013, when brothers Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev dropped two pressure-cooker 
bombs near the finish line of the Boston marathon race, killing three and injuring an 
estimated 264 people. Over the past several years lone wolf terrorism has been the 
media’s primary dialogue. 
Gaps in Literature 
The lone wolf threat has been always relevant, but the element of this 
phenomenon has not been sufficiently examined. Academic scholars hypothesize whether 
the phrase has provoked a sense of fear and dread, and how much does the media 
contributes to a certain degree, based upon the threat of the mystique (Stewart, 2011). 
However, when looking at the lone wolf history, there is a significant gap between lone 
wolf theory and lone wolf practice. To put the lone wolf threat into the proper context, an 
assessment of this gap would be very helpful, and doing so would provide an 
understanding of the lone wolf phenomenon and their history (Stewart, 2011). The media 
must have a different approach to lone wolf terrorism when trying to dispel the mystique 
and address the problems lone wolves pose. Common sense and knowledge implies that 
accomplishing this objective is not simple. 
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O’Donnell and Gray (2012) mentioned that terrorism expert Brian M. Jenkins 
expressed that “Terrorism is a Theatre,” and that the media is its greatest resource and 
cause. When an attack or act occurs the media continuously show its viewers narrative 
scenes from the activity. Jenkins argued that this was witnessed twice throughout the 
world, during the 1972 Olympics and the September 11, 2001, attacks (O’Donnell & 
Gray, 2012). The media can counter opposing terrorism methods by limiting the amount 
of coverage shown on terrorist activities. As technology has emerged, information via 
media outlets are accessible to almost anyone around the world.  
Terrorist’s propaganda and websites are being viewed on Face book, Twitter, and 
YouTube, to inform, discover, and interact with the potential lone wolf terrorists. The 
media, even after the September 11 attacks, caused confusion regarding the unsettling 
political situation surrounding Iran’s nuclear plants and Edward Snowden’s release of 
classified information (Greenwald, 2014). Though these are ongoing events, the media 
would be purposely driven, given their considered attention to the Middle East, to 
highlight the chaos characterized by religious clashes and democratic opposition.  
People’s reaction to the media coverage of terrorism varies, but it does have an 
everlasting effect on them. Shoshani and Slone (2008) did a study and assessed the 
reactions of 300 Israeli adults. The individuals were randomly chosen and they either 
watched terrorism or non-terrorism related media on television. What they found was that 
emotional and attitudinal reactions to terrorism in the media were a lot higher than those 
on the non-terrorism media viewers. These findings reveal how a considerable amount of 
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media coverage can significantly affect an individual’s emotional and attitudinal 
reactions through the persuasion of media (Shoshoni & Slone, 2008). 
Terrorist attacks get considerable media attention. Those that are specific and 
surprising, creating high levels of uncertainty and the perception of a severe threat, define 
disaster situations (Saunter & Carafano, 2012). The September 11 terrorist attacks were 
clearly defined as a disaster, and people agree that it was one the most disastrous in 
modern U.S. history. It is important to understand the traumatic effect of these situations 
and how they can be prevented or reduced. The media has not realized how much lone 
wolf terrorists are counting on them, to lead their cause. The more the situation demands 
a question from memory, the more likely an inaccurate response will be made (Lindsay, 
2011).  
Michael (2013) noted that the Internet is prevalent and serves a variety of 
purposes. Those issues stem from social issues, emergencies, and or disastrous situations. 
Terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda use the Internet and other media outlets for propaganda 
reasons. Research shows both the positive and negative aspects of media related 
terrorism, yet, terrorist propaganda mirror the effect of the domestic self-radicalized lone 
wolf. This involves no communication or direct links to establish terrorist organizations, 
as well as taken advantage of the new media platform (Howie, 2012).  
Guterman (2013) focused on terrorism and media but centered the approach on 
how Muslims are portrayed in the media. The media is very careful and maneuvers 
through dangerous grounds, to not cause further controversy, or use bias overtones 
regarding Muslim relations in this state, per Muslim Americans. Guterman, however, did 
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not go into details of why they might feel that way and why some resents Americans, 
leading to an increase in lone wolf terrorism activities here in the states. 
Historical Perspective 
Lone wolf terrorism is not a new phenomenon. This is factual of modern terrorist 
acting like past anarchists and their extremist views and agendas. Individuals who 
expressed their radical beliefs and used violence as a result were likely motivated by 
mental distress and poverty (Kassel, 2009). In the beginning, terrorism was not a choice 
of violence. Terrorism came about because of stressful economic conditions, public 
fighting, and government suppression of diplomatic controlled practices and 
demonstrations, which led to the creation of anarchist motivation. This started a domino 
effect of social resentment, suppression, and retaliation. Although readings show a 
greater period where information could have been quantifiably examined, the trail of 
terrorist activities could be traced back from four decades (Rasler & Thompson, 2009). 
In the U.S. from about the 1960’s and beyond, the leaderless resistance model was 
associated with White supremacists and people who were against the government. 
Political Research Associates (2013) associated the term “leaderless resistance” to 
impulsive, self-ruling, unknown, or identified individuals trying to commit acts of 
violence, or terrorism toward a government or government entity. The term is frequently 
credited to Louis Beam, an American white nationalist, but Beam gives praise to Ulius 
“Pete” Louis Amoss, a U.S. intelligence officer who wrote about leaderless resistance in 
1953. The term is used in numerous of ways to refer to individuals or networks, which 
causes confusion. Comparatively, leaderless resistance was associated with individuals 
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that engage with cells and lack the hierarchical command associations (Political Research 
Associates, 2013). 
Research Strategy 
The following databases were used in conducting the literature search: RAND 
Database of Worldwide Terrorism incidents (RDWTI), Post-9/11 Terrorism Database, 
Data Collections-Start-National Consortium for The Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism, and ProQuest Dissertations & Theses. Additional websites such as The 
Department of Homeland Security and Google Scholar was also used. The following 
keywords were asserted: terrorism, loner, lone wolf terrorism, lone wolf, lone wolf 
terrorist, domestic terrorism, terrorism threats, stray mutts, and self-radicals. 
Recommendations from the keyword articles led to discovering more resources. Those 
resources found was directly associated with lone wolf terrorists or lone wolf terrorism. 
This assessment highlighted lone wolf terrorism and their threats in the homeland. 
Theoretical Framework 
The leaderless resistance concept formed the theoretical base for setting aside the 
mystique of the lone wolf to examine the reality of the phenomenon. The concept offered 
a theoretical approach that personifies concerns related to lone wolves, which are those 
acting outside of known, identified and/or established leadership hierarchy. It focused on 
what causes individuals to unilaterally take violent actions in the name of a political or 
social cause. Similar studies used leaderless resistance as their framework to explain the 
phenomenon as a new strategy to show the diminishment of terrorist and insurgent 
movements internationally (Michael, 2012). This study focused on the phenomenon—
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distinguishing them from other types of violence and terrorism (Michael, 2012). The 
leaderless resistance concept is the idea strategy model of opposition and guide 
individuals or micro groups to fully participate unilaterally in any established leadership 
hierarchy. While leaderless resistance is used to shun detection, penetration, and trial by 
the state, the problem manifests and individuals become immune to counter-ideology 
(Joosse, 2007). It is when this process is identified that national security officials can 
collaborate and foster solutions on how to approach this growing threat. This is the point 
where all securing officials create a plan for lone wolf terrorism.  
RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI) was created as a 
project to tackle the most complex problems facing our nation, such as terrorism (RTD, 
2013). The leaderless resistance theory illustrated that there is a lack of cohesiveness 
movement within and relies on the unilateral approach. This made it easier to 
differentiate between individuals and organizations, which assisted in identifying 
characteristics of lone wolf terrorists. Atran (2006) stated unity is not always promising, 
especially after seeing the leaderless resistance transformation of Jihadist networks in the 
wake of diminishing group networks.  
Although it is not in the best interest to overstate the engagements of leaderless 
resistance, leaderless resistance as a concept is broadly talked about. The fact that the 
attacks are so far and few in between makes it a complex task to understand the “how” of 
lone wolf terrorism. Seeking information that pertains to this terrorist threat is important 
to finding few answers to the many questions that go unanswered (Bakker & de Graff, 
2010).  
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According to Steward (2011), for all who have been paying attention to the news 
as of late, the media has been overwhelmed with a steady stream of statements regarding 
lone wolf terrorists:  
While many of these statements, such as those from President Barack Obama, 
Vice President Joseph Biden and Department of Homeland Security Director 
Janet Napolitano, were made in the days leading up to the 10th anniversary of the 
9/11 attacks, they did not stop when the threats surrounding the anniversary 
proved to be unfounded and the date passed without incident. Indeed on Sept. 14, 
the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, Matthew Olsen, told CNN 
that one of the things that concerned him most was finding that next lone-wolf 
terrorist before he strikes. (p.1)  
One reason the leaderless resistance model is advocated is because it creates fear and 
uncertainty. There is a belief that at some point, lone wolf terrorists will not have the 
choice of network affiliation. 
Leaderless resistance theory is useful and relevant to explore the factors that 
influence, contribute, and justify an individual pathway to terrorism. This model further 
examined the advantages and disadvantages. An advantage of using the leaderless 
resistance model is that it makes lawsuits and prosecutions (Civil and RICO) more 
complex. However, by using this model, the lone wolf is not able to sustain key 
methodological objectives because of a lack of coordination. Leaderless resistance theory 
demonstrates how the following has become dysfunctional and unorganized. It also 
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demonstrates that there are few established leadership hierarchies that would be 
recognized within the general population.  
The leaderless resistance theory has evolved from Islamist threat. The value of 
using the leaderless model is that it puts the threat into context. The leaderless resistance 
theory presented ways to address how lone wolf terrorism came about, thus offering a 
unique opportunity to understand the issues that impose a great deal of pain among the 
masses. This study addressed the insufficient examination of this phenomenon 
formulated by the theory versus its practice. The decision to study lone wolf terrorism 
was compelled by less attacks at home being grouped (organizations), making it difficult 
for national security to stop the violence and mayhem from increasing domestically. 
Conveying the correct information is a critical step in dismissing the mystique and 
addressing the problems posed by such individuals in a realistic and rational way.  
The examination of literature to understand how the leaderless resistance theory 
relates to lone wolf terrorist in the U.S. was considered by their very own nature. Other 
theoretical models considered included the Van Gelder (2013) rational choice model, 
which considers the cost versus benefits of crime focusing on the individual’s decision 
making. Mose’s (2010) model reviewed the role of attitudes in bad behavior for 
participants with multiple problems, such as anger and psychological impairment. They 
both identified potential reasons of why, but neither accentuated the attacks are less 
vulnerable to the traditional methods of national security. 
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Leaderless Jihad: The Modern Face of Terror 
Muslim extremists account for a small number within the population. If a small 
number of Muslims account for a small percentage, then why are many juvenile Muslims 
led to extremist versions of Islam through grassroots radical establishments within their 
social community? What makes them become extremists? How can violent extremism be 
fought and routed? In Marc Sageman’s book, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the 
Twenty First Century, he discussed all the above questions. Marc Sageman, who is a 
counterterrorism consultant and forensic psychiatrist, provided a thorough consider the 
current global Islamist terrorist threat, exploring its progression from the 1980s through 
the latest wave of terrorism (Arndt, 2011).  
Waugh (2006) noted how, in the book Leaderless Jihad, Sageman continuously 
fills in and adds to his prior work on what causes extremist elements of terrorism within 
their social community. He also noted that Sageman’s work is unique, because of his 
“data –based” approach to al-Qaeda’s study. Throughout the book, he organized 
individual terrorist profiles to garner data in relation to their characteristics, psychological 
factors, risk factors, and mindsets. The al-Qaeda-led Islamist terrorist following 
contained thousands of individuals. It is comprised of terrorist networks that got together 
in route to terrorism. The networks may perhaps develop into official organizations like 
al-Qaeda due to shifting circumstances (Alexander, 2009).  
Even though al-Qaeda’s core is centered alongside the Afghanistan-Pakistan 
border, the radicalized terror following has evolved and grown beyond its grassroots 
origination (Gartenstein-Ross, 2009). Today’s al-Qaeda and terrorist networks have an 
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offspring as the result of several chronological terrorism cycles. The veterans of anti-
Soviet following in Afghanistan, who collaborated with Osama bin Laden, were the first 
cycle of al-Qaeda’s following in the 1980s. Individuals who went and trained through al-
Qaeda’s training camps comprised the second wave of followers. Al-Qaeda’s core was 
major during this cycle, personally sending their terrorists all over the world (Said, 2012).  
Cox (2009) said nonetheless, the third wave, are the individuals who emerged in 
the post 9/11 era, those who connected to the al-Qaeda following during the outing of the 
Taliban when U.S. led invasions into Iraq and Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda has lost many of its 
training camp facilities and the locations where they were once deemed safe. But their 
social following is more encompassing than before due to the global use of the Internet, 
where the organization has had success in radicalizing a new breed of individuals, 
including many who are among the second-following of Muslim individuals in North 
America and Europe. These were the followers, for example, that went and carried out 
terrorist acts on the London’s transportation system in July 2005.  
Sageman wrote that the third wave of individual followers feel that they are 
heroes, regardless of right or wrong, and therefore they transitioned during this cycle:   
Sageman asserted, the course of their radicalization is a result of an 
 individual’s logic to what he perceives his affliction to be of what his fellow 
 Muslim followers are going through around the world; no matter if his affliction
 is in grievance with his own experience, for instance, obscurity in making the 
 West and, at last, organized networks that lead individuals sequentially to violent 
 radicalization by using terrorist cells (Tucker, 2010, p.1).  
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Sageman suggested making terrorism less eventful as an alternative method to the 
social following movement encouraged by al-Qaeda (Sustein, 2008). Juvenile Muslims 
can be better suited if they are a part of the solution to resolve the local clashes that are 
intensified by al-Qaeda’s propaganda in the Muslim community. Juvenile Muslims are 
deemed heroes if they join the movements, so they should have alternative choices and 
individual freedom without being force or manipulated in joining al-Qaeda’s movement. 
Shift Toward Leaderless Resistance 
There is no doubt that the threat of lone wolf terrorism is serious, but one must 
first recognize its history. To say lone wolf terrorism has been in existence forever is like 
saying it is a natural part of society. History has shown that lone wolf terrorism today is 
very similar to past terrorism that emerged in the 1800s, when fixated individuals like 
Leon Czolgosz were so adamant on changing the political situation. Leon Czolgosz, the 
anarchist who assassinated U.S. President William McKinley in 1901, was a lone wolf, 
according to the University of Buffalo (2013).  
In 1971, The National Alliance was created by a White supremacist who called 
for the segregation of whites from others, specifically Jews (National Alliance, 2011). 
The National Alliance is a network dedicated to advancing the ideas of the deceased 
founder William Pierce, whose core beliefs are strictly in the realm of white supremacy. 
William Pierce was one of the defendants of Fort Smith in 1989 that wrote a novel titled 
Hunter, in tribute to a fictitious lone wolf. The book was intended to be a guiding treatise 
for lone wolves like Joseph Paul Franklin, to whom the book was, dedicated (National 
Alliance, 2011). 
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According to the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) (2013), Richard Kelly Hoskins 
was another white supremacist, but he was not as well-known as William Pierce. Hoskins 
was a financial advisor in Virginia, and he advocated for racism for nearly five decades, 
reasoning for the far right during the last two decades. He wrote many Christian-based 
commentaries that were popular at supremacist symposiums and sanctuaries. He was 
well-known for the concept of “Phineas Priesthood.” Those were white supremacists that 
used violence to retaliate crime against the white race.  
Louis Beam, a Fort Smith defendant that hated the government, developed 
concepts in an essay entitled “Leaderless Resistance” in 1992. The essay contained an 
orthodox pyramid scheme of an organization and he thought it was not only useless but 
also very dangerous. He supported and argued that it was best to continue the military 
and ideological fight through independent cells (Beutel, 2007). The movement or 
following has not flourished the way white supremacists like Pierce, Hoskins, and Beam 
envisioned it. Even before the 9/11 attacks, several decades had gone by since the rise of 
leaderless resistance. The success of lone wolf attacks has faltered due to the penetration 
of the government; this is exactly why those leaders shifted to the leaderless resistance to 
further the White supremacy agenda.  
To date, the leaderless resistance model is not only used by the far-right wing, but 
the left wing adopted a similar model as well. They specifically supported the Earth 
Liberation Front (ELF) and the Animal Liberation Front (ALF). The ELF and its 
partnering network, the ALF, is environment friendly and against the progression of 
manufacturing if it is not for the bettering of the environment and animals (Anti-
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Defamation League, 2013). ELF and ALF are very smart and dissimilar to Islamic 
terrorists. They want people to see what they are doing, unlike others, and they would 
rather attack property than people. The crimes are usually associated with burnings and 
property damage.  
Bjelopera (2011) stated, over the last decade, jihadists for some of the same 
reasons have taken a leaderless resistance approach. The group approach from al-Qaeda 
has transformed into a leaderless approach. The twenty-first century of Islamic terror 
networks seems to be more loose, self-regulating, and have more random entities than 
their prior groups, who were a part of the September 11 atrocities. The concept has gone 
from the network of top al Qaida officials, scheming enormous resources and giving 
orders, to a huge number of low network members that are trying to execute leaderless 
jihad from the bottom up. 
Lone wolf terrorists may not be physically supported or have the guidance of 
figureheads from a network, but they form a very violent social following using the 
Internet. Terrorism has always been associated with the Middle East and other countries 
across seas; yet, it has migrated to Western countries. The challenge in the twenty-first 
century for governments is trying to stay one step ahead to detect and neutralize these 
individuals before they become violent. To have any type of success against the threat 
that is very much real and dangerous, the process must first be understood, which has 
consequences for Western governments if they cannot detect the threat during the process 
(Sedgwick, 2012). 
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Lone Wolf: Characteristics, Psychological Factors, Risk Factors, and Mindset 
Finalized reports from research summaries have shown that lone wolf terrorists who 
individually commit solo acts of terror on their own behalf, away from established 
terrorist organizations, constitute a growing threat toward U.S. national security. The 
characteristics of lone wolf attacks have prompted differing assessments upon 
commutative reports. Gruenewald, Chermak, and Freilich (2013) stated that far-right 
extremist usually consist of the military, the least to marry, those who envision dying at 
the scene of the crime, hanging out alone, firing weapons, shooting multiple victims, and 
choosing government targets. These same characteristics are also the distinguishing 
factors from each other.  
Lone wolf acts, in comparison, are more significant and have brought a new sense 
of a new awareness from national security. The U.S. government examined the 
characteristics regarding lone wolves in two forms: school attackers and assassins 
(McCauley, Moskalenko, & Van Son, 2013). The results revealed that lone wolves were 
mainly white males, and both groups of individuals were dominant lone perpetrators. 
Conversely, military service, marriage, and education varied in relation to assassins than 
school attackers. They seemed to be older, or adults that had more years of opportunity to 
achieve entering the military, getting married, or getting a degree versus the school 
attackers (McCauley et al (2013). The other demographic characteristics, as documented 
by McCauley et al (2013), are also displayed in Table 1. 
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Table 1 
Themes Derived from the Data Analysis of Lone Wolf Characteristics 
 School 
attackers 
N=41 
Assassins 
N=83 
 
    
Lone Actor 81 70  
Male 100 86  
Caucasian  76 77  
Age range 11-21 16-73 (M=35)  
Served in military 01 55  
Never married 1001 492  
High school education or less 1001 54  
Ever arrested  27 66  
History of substance abuse 24 39  
History of depression or despair 783 44  
1 Percentage assumed, not explicit in School Report 
2 Corrected percentage, 41/83=49%, where Assassins Report gives 51% 
3 Percentage reported having suicidal thoughts or suicidal attempts 
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As reported above, school attackers are much younger than assassins. The U.S. 
government report shows no military entry for school attackers compared to about 50% 
of assassins. Forty-nine percent of assassins had never married in comparison to school 
attackers who never married. Both groups’ criminal records differ greatly. Not knowing 
assassins’ arrest records as teenagers makes it difficult to interpret. Depression, despair, 
and a history of suicidal thoughts vary tremendously with school attackers (78%) and 
assassins. Surprisingly, school attackers had a higher percentage, although assassins were 
much older and had more of an opportunity to achieve such things (McCauley et al., 
2013). 
Psychological Factors 
Three psychological factors emerged as contributors to the radicalization of lone 
wolves: group relative deprivation, identity conflicts, and personality characteristics 
(King & Taylor, 2011). The lone wolf terrorist seems to feel some sort of deprivation, 
which is essentially the mind-set that occurs because of feeling not equal, in a sense, and 
unspoken within a group of individuals. This concept was first seen in Stoufer et al.’s 
(2005) work about no formal explanation of the concept or course of action regarding its 
examination. Crosby (2006) had a different explanation and his reviews emphasized the 
concept of relativeness: deprivation is felt in relation to others with the aim of comprising 
a reference group (Barcena-Martin, Imedio-Olmedo, and Martin-Reyes, 2007). 
Identity conflicts can be inspired by many things, but identity regarding a 
religious following is known to be amongst the most intriguing, due to the holy views 
they are associated with. Religion is associated with the spiritual uplifting of an 
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individual, bringing out a person’s sense of belonging and conviction; it also leads to 
small-mindedness, prejudices, and radical aggressiveness (Agbiboa, 2013). Each of us 
sees the world from a different perspective and this can cause conflicts, especially when 
individual can only view the world from his or her perspective.  
Merari, Diamant, Bibi, Broshi, and Zakin (2010) had shown major differences 
between personality characteristics that were found between lone wolves that were and 
were not suicidal terrorists. There were two central personality characteristics found 
among the would-be suicides. One group of lone wolves were found to have low levels of 
strength and were independent and had an anti-social personality, a characteristic that 
made them less likely to be in a group and least likely to have social influence. Others 
were examined as being emotional and/or having a deranged life style. 
Risk Factors 
Because of the perceived threats of lone wolf’s post 9/11, The U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) has nullified counter-terror measures, and work is ongoing to 
expand others. Lone wolf terrorists are flexible and tend to shift their strategies, methods, 
and events when countermeasures are put into place, different from normal or unplanned 
man-made disasters. When trying to gage the lone wolf, it is difficult due to the limited 
data which makes it hard to confront the threat. Examining the lone wolf terrorist groups 
operating outside of the established leadership hierarchy is a challenge for all securing 
officials (Lemieux & Regens, 2012). 
DiRenzo and Das (2012) used the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) and found that 
state revenue has a major relationship connection when evaluating the terrorist risk, after 
40 
 
considering all other implications that were associated with terrorism. The findings urged 
them to look at the GTI data variables to further examine the relationship between 
revenue and income. Particularly, state revenue was found to be a major correlation with 
other states’ counter-terrorism measures or the deterrence risk factors. The debate is that 
states with more money have larger capabilities to employ counter-terrorism and security 
measures than states with less money. 
According to Schmid and Jongman’s classic book, Political Terrorism, the grass-
roots origin of terrorism lays in oppression. Many scholars have given different advice in 
relation to risk factors for lone wolf terrorism. Many focused-on group followings, the 
individual’s state of mind, their environment, or economic conditions. However, many 
talk about the oppression as an annoyance. Walter Laqueur distinctively said that 
oppression and terrorism are conversely linked (Victoroff, Adelamn, & Stern, 2006). 
Mindset 
White (2010) said that the mindset of lone wolf terrorist involves his or her 
logical and responsive nature on the topic of a given situation or threat. This element is 
the first phase of decision making and included the terrorist who may be at the forefront 
and center of the situation and must decide to either participate, or not get involved with 
the situation at hand (perceived threat). If he or she chooses to not get involved, then he 
or she will bypass the following issue. However, if they choose to participate in the 
situation at hand, they must follow through and evaluate how they are going to attack this 
threat. When they feel comfortable and ready to take on with what they perceive to be a 
threat, this is when their confidence will rise and allow them to begin the next phase. 
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Lone wolf terrorists are believed to commit terrorist acts because of various 
motivational factors. It is well-known that established terrorist organizations employ 
social and psychological strategies to brainwash individuals into their ideological 
mindset. They use strategies to convince and simplify the phenomenon around the 
individual. Because of the individuals’ likely economic and social conditions, it is only a 
matter of time before these strategies begin to work and these individuals become 
terrorists. Nonetheless, it mirrors the effects of motivational factors in becoming a lone 
wolf terrorist (Eren, 2007).  
Basibuyuk, Karakus, and Akdogan (2007) noted fundamentalism is associated 
with the mindset or base, especially when it comes to religion:   
It is referred to as the core template. This is one of the most debated concepts 
among scholars and theologians. When a person is looking from the outside in, 
fundamentalism is usually associated with being stigmatized, a scornful title 
“associated with private, coldblooded, and strict behavior.” Equally, carrying the 
title of a fundamentalist can also be a foundation of morality and superiority for 
exclusives who like to see themselves as showing pure faith in obeying religious 
commands.  
Even though fundamentalism can be related to concepts or a set of identities or be viewed 
as a collective phenomenon, it also has an individual element and perception. 
Lone Wolf: The Most Significant Threat to U.S. National Security 
Over the next several years, the most significant homeland terrorism threat will 
come from the lone wolf terrorist. They are inspired by established terrorist organizations 
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but act on the peripheries of those movements (Kouri, 2011). With all the mayhem 
subsiding in the Muslim communities, established terrorist organizations will attempt to 
recruit more individuals on behalf of their organization. These unknown and unidentified 
individuals are mysterious to leadership within terrorist organizations, but these 
individuals present the most significant threat to the U.S. It is assumed, because of 
international cooperation and collaboration in the realm of international terrorism, there 
will be a further decline in group terrorism. Sagers Herzog (2013) said to make no 
mistake, lone terrorist threats are and will continue to be the most significant threat to 
national security. 
One thing terrorist organizations have done was collaborate with each other and 
will continue to do so to accomplish their desired end goal against the U.S. These 
organizations might be bound by range, but their free lancing will challenge the U.S. 
government to counter the threats and/or attacks. Al-Qaeda and their loose associations 
will continue to be the most significant threat over the next several years, according to 
Mike Snopes, who is head of a security firm and a former police commander in New 
York (Lasky, 2012). The FBI (2013) predicts that administrative districts and agencies 
outside of the government will have a growing role in world events for future years to 
come, showing new disproportional threats to the U.S. 
The U.S. may take the lead in trying to thwart the lone wolf threat and/or attacks, 
but other nations will likely play a critical role. Governments are going to have to extend 
some control through capital resources, services, and employees (Preble, 2011). The 
administrative districts and agencies outside of government will likely be first responders. 
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Despite the limited resources, it does not cost much for lone wolves carry out attacks. For 
example, James Holmes, who is an American, entered a movie theatre in Colorado and 
killed at least 12 people and wounded more than 50 in his lone melee. When the attacks 
are successful, they usually are high-profile, very dangerous attacks, and their plan is 
extremely challenging to detect. With the globalization of technology that continues to 
network world economies, the economies will become more reliant on each other in years 
to come. Some parts of the country will stabilize, but the income gap between nations and 
cities are likely to make some countries and individuals a hotbed for terrorism.  
As national concepts and boundaries become more complex and global, the 
distinction between national and international themes will blur. This will threaten 
national security by creating and linking national and international terrorist prospects or 
criminal organizations. Most scholars say the more technology is developed, the more it 
will have a profound effect on the collective ability of governments to protect this nation. 
With current technology advances, the process is transforming and will continue to 
transform. The U.S. and other countries are going through the most significant global 
transformation. The U.S. has seen no other like it since it went from an agriculture nation 
to an industrial nation. The transformation and technological advances allow lone wolf 
terrorists to access many things like weapons technology unlike the pre-Internet era 
(McComb, 2013).  
Shea (2013) stated that technological advances have allowed lone wolves to stay 
one step ahead of national security. For example, stories have been on the news in 
relation to individuals purchasing poisonous gases or biological warfare agents, and how 
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challenging it was for national security officials to trace where the specific agent was 
bought. In the 21st Century, terrorism is no longer associated with the Middle East; it has 
no confinement to any territory and neither do the criminals. Instead, they see this as a 
major opportunity (Asal, Ackerman, & Rethemeyer, 2012).  
Lieber and Press (2013) talked about how nuclear weapons and terrorist acts have 
already been a topic of discussion, but this discussion is expected to increase 
considerably. With what we already know about terrorist tactics, the expectation for them 
to try to secure nuclear weapons is something that is feared and dreaded. Technological 
advances made it simpler to move nuclear material around the world. As with the iPhone, 
the basics of nuclear science and technologies are more easily understood, enabling 
terrorists to produce nuclear weapons. Similarly, basic materials are readily assessable to 
obtain (Mauroni, 2013). Terrorist threats in the homeland have only scratched the surface 
and will continue in the U.S. for the next several years. The once-proud tradition of far-
left groups who tried to overthrow the U.S. government because of the manufacturing 
advances seems to have gone away in recent years. However, new individuals or groups 
have emerged that can amass new threats.  
The states that perceive the U.S. to be their biggest threat or rival will likely 
remain that way or increase that perception. The most looked-for U.S. targets will be 
governmental and armed forces’ strategies and objectives, expertise, and capital 
establishments; individually, governmental and non-governmental. Intelligence officials 
from other nations will increase their targeting scheme to recruit U.S. personnel overseas 
by using informal techniques and collections methods to further their agenda (Klein, 
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2012). With the advancement and secure methods of technology, intelligence officials 
from other nations will use this method to draw upon individuals and to characterize the 
procurement of secure technology methods to discreetly post all over the United States. 
How the Theory Translates into Practice 
Emerging lone wolves will be able to be more discreet, making it more complex 
for national security officials and intelligence agencies to apprehend them. More recently, 
this can be illustrated by examples such as the Washington Navy Yard shooter Aaron 
Alexis, and Umar Abdulmutallab, the Christmas day bomber who had hidden explosives 
taped into his underwear in 2009. These attacks are less costly, but they are very violent 
and dangerous. Lone wolves and micro-cells do present sole challenges, but transforming 
beliefs into actions has proven to be difficult. For every Timothy McVeigh and Nidal 
Hasan, there is an Umar Abdulmutallab, the lone wolf that fails often due to a lack of 
resources, faulty structure, or the fact that they are apprehended before the attack can 
occur.  
Very seldom are there lone wolves who have the skills, will, and the combination 
of resources to carry out a successful lone wolf attack. When they can translate theory 
into practice, the result is success. Failed attacks are associated with irresponsibility and a 
lack of patience and skill. The lone wolf frequently miscalculates the attack and does not 
have a good assessment of the target, which is often far beyond their capabilities. When 
they attempt something that is beyond their measures, it often results in a complete 
botched attempt (Pantucci, 2011).  
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Teich (2013) mentioned that the ability to become a lone wolf does not require 
any skill or experience. All that is required is simply a resistance to a lifestyle and the 
ability to carry out attacks. Those skills and experience can only come with time, and the 
best chance for success lies in small victories. Small victories fare better than one giant 
blotched attempt, which may likely be his or her last attempt as a lone wolf. Every second 
and every level of resistance counts. Information is the key and successful attacks align 
with planning accordingly and avoiding prior mistakes by their predecessors.  
Since the attacks are individually manned respectively, he or she is exposed to 
detection at some point in the process and therefore must avoid riskier situations, like 
being detected by cameras, to reduce the risk of detection (Stratford Analysis, 2011). It 
takes more effort in to bomb a large building than using a meek box cutter knife. 
Although the latter does not require much effort, the lone wolf still must plan the steps. 
The advantage of using the leaderless resistance is that there is little to no 
communication, which complicates the process.  
Acting alone simply requires a lot of time, self-training, and for him or her to 
collect all the required resources prior to an attack. Considering what it takes and requires 
for an individual to transform a belief into action (lone wolf theory to practice), there are 
not many individuals who possess these skills to carry out attacks. It can be concluded, in 
part, why this theory has been around so long and why there have not been more attacks, 
despite the fact of the media polarization (Andrews, 2009). 
Undoubtedly, lone wolves do present a threat, but that threat should not be 
exaggerated or ignored. Lone attackers are not mythological individuals that impose 
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harm. Lone wolves follow a process and are vulnerable to detection. Examining the 
phenomenon is a critical step in dismissing the mystique and addressing the problems 
posed by lone wolves in a rational and practical way. 
Preventing Lone Wolf Terrorism 
In the realm of homeland security, there has always been the following question: 
do we sacrifice individual freedom to prevent the next terrorist attack? Most Americans 
do not want to sacrifice individual freedom. Individual freedom is one of America’s 
greatest assets and liabilities. Preventing the next terrorist attack require a compromise of 
what we have treasured for over two centuries: individual liberty.  Downing and Mayer 
(2013) said that national security must take what it has learned from the Boston marathon 
attacks and answer a vital question: how can the U.S. create an operative security net 
involving state-run and local law enforcement organizations? 
The U.S. would benefit more if organizations were developed to the extent of how 
the FBI was introduced in1908: to create an additional level of expertise and 
specialization toward lone wolves and to share critical information beyond certain 
jurisdictions. Intelligence agencies lack information sharing because of federal and state 
policies. This culture can no longer be tolerated and must quickly change to prevent the 
next lone wolf attack.  
Lone wolf attacks are often difficult to carry out, but that does not stop the state of 
the threat (Coffey, 2011). Reports surfaced that the FBI had information on the Boston 
suspects, but because of the advice on behalf of the United States Attorney’s Office, they 
could not share it. If this was the case, a few things should happen: Congress should 
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rewrite legislation allowing information to be either passed or shared, or reevaluate the 
organization that is holding such information (FBI, 2013).  
Ritchey (2013) talked about the power of partnerships, particularly, the FBI’s lead 
role in the Boston bombing case. The lone wolf committed a crime before it became an 
act or terror. If the FBI would have shared the intelligence with the local police 
department the attack could have been prevented. The lack of information sharing 
between federal and state law enforcement organizations hinder investigations and create 
gaps within the intelligence. This is where such policy and legislation would benefit 
national security and potentially save lives. Best practices should be revisited in terms of 
the legal structure and formality.  
Governmental entities are less likely to distribute any information that may prove 
harmful when a series of practices arise in a case like the Boston bombing attacks. 
Investigators are subject to restriction with information sharing and this policy has 
allowed attacks to be underwritten at home. In contrast to the federal government, lone 
wolf acts confront minor challenges since the cost of terrorist attacks are minimal. 
Individual acts require less resources given that they do not operate under an established 
terrorist hierarchy, field commanders, engage with others or propaganda dissemination, 
operate openly or deliver goods (Perlmutter, 2013). Criminal cases shall be handled 
locally rather than by the federal government.  
It is a challenge, and it is intensely difficult in identifying the next lone wolf 
terrorist. Sacrificing individual freedom will never totally eradicate the threat of 
terrorism; this would only hamper individuals’ freedom, which makes this nation the 
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best. The U.S. can, however, make changes constitutionally that would enhance the 
chances of detecting lone wolves and averting future lone wolf terrorist attacks.  
Social Change Mechanism 
Assessing the change process regarding the greater security concern requires an 
understanding of the phenomenon. Moreover, an assessment is needed to look at the 
underlying mechanisms and processes that lead individuals to be drawn to or away from 
existing radical movements (TTRSL, 2008). This study addressed the gap by studying the 
individual phenomenon as oppose to the group phenomenon. 
As stated by Mendelson (2008), terrorism is an inter-reliant structure of elements 
and individuals, and a more comprehensive understanding of the lone wolf terrorist 
phenomenon can be assessed by viewing it in a multifaceted scheme. Scholars normally 
view lone wolf terrorism as a group phenomenon to get general understanding; a single 
examination starts with the identification of an individual (lone wolf); examining the 
elements of that greater society, and then viewing the problem or phenomenon within that 
greater society. The view from many scholars and securing officials is that a major 
challenge and/or limitation of the leaderless lone wolf are that they are hard to detect.  
As Stewart (2011) said, it is very challenging to separate between those radicals 
who have every intention to commit terror acts from those who just voice their opinion. 
To distinguish the probable lone wolf before they act, national security officials must use 
unlimited resources and time searching for these individuals. This is a frightening 
assignment, considering the vast number of potential suspects that are out there. A 
consortium approach between all levels of government will help take on these challenges. 
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Another change that can help effectively achieve this goal is that they require consistent 
engagement from all businesses and communities. 
Summary 
Identifying the lone wolf terrorist, whose attacks are high profile, very dangerous, 
and extremely challenging to detect, before they act poses a significant threat to national 
security, and is the essential reason national security officials are concerned. Lone wolf 
terrorists act alone from established hierarchies, forcing national security officials to try 
to comprehend the “how and why” he or she transform to a terrorist. National security 
officials must identify individual terrorist activities carried out by those individuals from 
those carried out as a part of terrorist networks. In concern of the potential impact of lone 
wolf terrorism on national security, characteristics regarding the lone wolf terrorist 
formulate a knowledge base to identify potential suspects.  
As indicated by FBI Director Robert Mueller (2003), lone wolf terrorists, those 
who individually and independently commit solo acts of terror on their own behalf away 
from established terrorist organizations, are the most difficult to seek out before they act 
and hence pose a huge security concern. No statement was more significant than 
Hoffman’s forewarning in 2013. Homeland terrorism in the United States today may be 
more of a threat than global terrorism. The homeland terrorist threat in our country 
constitutes the framework to explain the phenomenon as a new strategy to show the 
diminishment of terrorist and insurgent movements internationally.  
The leaderless resistance model forms the theoretical basis for setting aside the 
mystique of the lone wolf and examining the reality of the phenomenon. Leaderless 
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resistance theory introduced by Ulius Amoss in 1962 personifies concerns related to lone 
wolves. As stated by Michael (2012), what caused individuals to unilaterally take violent 
actions in the name of a political or social cause remains an area of concern. Lacking a 
known, identified, or established leadership hierarchy, these troublesome individuals 
challenge the imbalance of power that manifests itself as a lone wolf, surfacing as 
terrorists or radical extremists, thereby creating difficulties to be stamped out. The 
implication of leaderless resistance theory to lone wolf terrorism is that the problem 
focuses on the phenomena aspects of the leaderless lone wolf terrorist and the underlying 
mechanisms and processes that lead individuals to be drawn to or away from an existing 
radical movement, to act unilaterally and without direction toward violent ends.  
For the lone wolf, building upon previous research for establishing a qualitative 
phenomenological approach was appropriate to address the threat of lone wolves. Lone 
attackers have demonstrated the threat they pose. They follow a pattern and are 
susceptible to exposure at some point in the process. Identifying this process is essential 
to addressing the problem posed by these individuals in a rational and practical way 
(Bjelopera, 2012). The leaderless resistance strategy was used to help identify intangible 
factors such as social norms, socioeconomic status, gender roles, ethnicity, and religion, 
whose role in the research may not be clear (Creswell, 2009). 
Similarly, Phillips (2011) discussed how the individualistic nature of lone wolf 
terrorism might, however, command more subtleness from several economic, theoretical 
models that may lend themselves to its analysis. The reviewing of literature provided 
insight into lone wolf terrorism and the changes that need to be made to address the 
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greater security concern. Lieberman and Collins (2011) pointed out that the role of 
national security is to involve others, such as the Attorney General, the Director of 
National Intelligence, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and direct coordination from 
the federal government to local levels of government. It is very important that the 
agencies be on the same page and have the proper training during the investigative 
process. Legal ethics training must be given to elude any violations of human rights and 
decisions that otherwise may violate civil freedoms (Bryneilson et al., 2013). While 
Lieberman and Collins’s plans suggested that role of national security should involve 
others and additional training, Stewart (2011) stated it is very challenging to separate 
between those radicals who have every intention to commit terrorist acts from those who 
just voice their opinion of hate and/or radical beliefs. To distinguish the probable lone 
wolf before they act, national security officials must use unlimited resources and time 
searching for individuals who may be transitioning their extreme beliefs into actions. 
Chapter 3 presents a qualitative research design as a method of study, consisting of 
secondary data analysis from the RAND and GTD databases. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
Lone wolf terrorism has been described as a convenient method for individuals to 
plan and conduct terrorist attacks by way of avoidance and a lack of detection. This study 
addressed factors beyond the general qualities of lone wolf terrorists. I examined whether 
factors such as social norms, socioeconomic status, gender, ethnicity, and religion affect 
the lone wolf phenomenon. This chapter includes the study design and how the data were 
collected and analyzed.  
When I conducted the study, I realized many advantages of qualitative research 
and a phenomenological design. I could understand the phenomenon by exploring the 
totality of data. In addition, qualitative research helped me uncover trends in the thought 
process of lone wolves and immerse further into the problem. Notably, I was in control of 
the study and it allowed me to explore the phenomenon in its natural setting. The 
qualitative researcher does not need to control the environment as in quantitative studies, 
which rely on numerical data (Qualitative Approaches, 2013). I sought answers to 
questions that underline how the phenomenon was formed and given significance.  
Research Question 
The following research question was used to guide the study: What are the 
underlying mechanisms and processes that lead individuals to be drawn to or away from 
an existing radical movement and to act unilaterally and without direction toward violent 
ends? The sub questions were as follows: What causes an individual to participate in lone 
wolf terrorism? Are there consistent and significant indicators that can characterize a 
potential lone wolf actor? 
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Research Design and Rationale 
To answer the central research question, I explored aspects of the leaderless lone 
wolf terrorist and its mechanisms and processes. An inclusive study of lone wolf 
terrorism was needed to promote U.S. national security. To identify the factors related to 
the phenomenon, I chose a phenomenological design.  
The rationale for using a phenomenological design is that it allowed me to focus 
on the experience of the individual regarding the phenomenon (see McNabb, 2010). The 
phenomenological design is ideal when the researcher seeks to gain a comprehensive 
understanding of a difficult problem and to broaden the practices of prior research 
(McNabb, 2010). The central question influenced selection of the research design.  
According to Creswell (2009), phenomenological inquiries are conducted to 
explain the phenomena according to the lived experiences of individuals. Qualitative 
research focuses on achieving a thorough understanding of a phenomenon or a type of 
experience (Creswell, 2009). Because there were limited studies involving lone wolf 
terrorism, it was challenging to find data. Most studies conducted on terrorism involved a 
group perspective, which limited the understanding of lone wolf terrorism. (Horne, 
2012). 
Qualitative Approaches 
When deciding on a qualitative phenomenological approach, I considered four 
other approaches: narrative, grounded theory, ethnographic, and case study. The narrative 
approach focuses on the hierarchy of social data. Furthermore, the narrative approach 
assumes that information is valuable and noteworthy even if it is known by only one 
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individual (Creswell, 2007). However, 177 individuals and incidents were included in 
this study.  
Grounded theory involves a bottom-up approach. A theory is developed from the 
process of collecting data and systemically coding it (Small, 2009). The intent of the 
current study was not to develop a theory for leaderless lone wolf terrorism. According to 
small (2009), ethnographic studies include trends and actions to get a better idea of the 
relations involving social clusters. This approach was not appropriate in exploring lone 
wolf terrorism because lone wolves might share common characteristics as a group, but 
lone wolves are not a group phenomenon. Case studies are limited by intervals and 
activities, which were not relevant to the current study (see University of South Alabama, 
2013). This study was conducted to understand the challenges and threats lone wolves 
pose to national security, and to explore individuals who share common characteristics 
and goals. The University of South Alabama (2013) stated that the examiner’s intent is to 
gain a pathway into the participant’s life experiences and the way the individual sees the 
world. The phenomenological design was best for this study. 
Phenomenological Design 
A phenomenological design is an effective way for the researcher to translate the 
personal experience of individuals into their personal perspective (Creswell, 2009). The 
design enables the researcher to develop a real-world theory to advise, assist, or contest a 
course of action (McNabb, 2010). Data on lone wolf terrorists were limited, and only 
studies that dissociated the lone wolf from the group phenomenon could address their 
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unique experiences. According to Creswell (2009), to gain a better understanding of the 
phenomenon, the researcher must analyze the role played by the phenomenon. 
Phenomenological research has developed into several methods and approaches to 
studying the lived experience of others. Phenomenology is used to investigate the origin 
and practice of something or someone (Sonoma University, 2013). Researchers often use 
the term when describing an approach to qualitative inquiry. Merely, phenomenology is a 
way of thinking that underlines a focus on individual experiences and how individuals 
see the world (Qualitative Approaches, 2013). 
Secondary Data Selection Process 
Secondary data selection is defined as the process of determining the suitable 
data, source, and the appropriate tools to collect data (Silverman, 2016). Prior to 
importing documents into NVivo (software), I selected data that were only relevant to 
lone wolf terrorism in the United States. The term differentiates data choice from data 
reporting (not using data that has no relevance to your study) and collection (secondary 
data analysis). The process allows researcher to choose the data that is the most viable to 
the study (Silverman, 2016).  
I selected the data documents and tools to sufficiently address questions. This 
selection is specific and is driven by the nature of the research project, current data, and 
the availability of data sources (see Marshall and Rossman, 2014). Ethical problems arise 
when data is based upon convenience and cost rather than proficiency to address the 
questions (Marshall and Rossman, 2014). Convenience and cost is important when and 
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data selection precedes data collection. The process of selecting suitable data for the 
study can comprise the data integrity of this study (Glaser & Laudel, 2013). 
Secondary data collection was driven by the nature of the study, current literature, 
and accessibility to essential data sources. The appropriate data came from many sources 
and was lone wolf specific. Secondary data analysis was convenient and less costly 
because the information had been researched during the qualitative research process. The 
accumulation or pre-establishment of data helped because I would not have been able to 
collect a rich amount of data.  
In addition, I use secondary data create a suitable phenomenological design to 
compare data analysis. Before I conducted the study, I made sure the data was aligned 
with the research questions. This allowed me to review similar sources of data and the 
data collection method. Secondary data was excellent to use not so much for the analysis 
of the pre-established information, but as a pre-designed study. The substantial amount of 
information available displayed pre-established levels of validity and reliability. 
Data Collection 
Current literature on lone wolf terrorism is sparse, but can be presented in 
numerous of ways. Few studies that have been conducted on lone wolf terrorism and it is 
difficult to extricate the data type and source that is few and far between. The goal of data 
collection was to select data that was representative of lone wolves domestically. 
National security officials can devise a plan and or form solutions from the suitable data. 
Failure to share information may underwrite further lone wolf attacks.  
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Secondary data collection in this study was retrieved from the RAND and GTD 
databases to research lone wolf terrorism. Both are electronic filed databases and 
compose of inclusive files regarding terrorist acts or efforts. Secondary data such as 
interviews, field notes, surveys, and other sourced material regarding lone wolf terrorism 
was examined. Data was assembled and filed from acts and efforts that had previously 
occurred. The databases were organized accordingly by date (after 9/11/01) and location 
(U.S.) and by the characterization of lone wolf terrorism outlined for the reasons of this 
study.  
When I carried out secondary data analysis, I examined the relationship between 
primary data and secondary data. I wanted to make sure the study questions from the 
analysis were identical to those of the previous study, and the primary data collection 
analytic techniques was applied to the secondary analysis (Northern Arizona University, 
2013). 
Data Analysis Methods 
Once all the suitable data was gathered, individual source data (audio files, 
transcripts, etc.) were produced for each of the individuals. I coded and divided the data 
into themes and it allowed me to categorize qualitative data and explore the scheme and 
specifics of the categories. The process begins with open coding, allowing for small 
amounts of data to be entered while developing other preliminary categories. The coding 
became more selective in terms of concepts and codes that were entered (Qualitative 
Approaches, 2013). NVivo qualitative analysis software was used to analyze source 
documents, whereas the analysis was more profound. Instead of manually analyzing the 
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data, NVivo analyze the source documents, which allows the researcher to build theories 
to answer and support the research questions (UCONN, 2013). Although, programs like 
NVivo are used to analyze source data, the data was also manually coded and recorded in 
the study for comfortability. 
When analyzing the source data, there were several steps. First, I was able to 
analyze and make sense of the data type and source. Second, I analyzed the data by going 
over it repeatedly (most of the qualitative researchers call this process “peeling the skin 
off the potatoes” in lieu of the data, and making an analysis (Creswell, 2009). Any cues 
from transcripts and/or interviews were used to verify and validate source data. The 
process was a guide and it limited potential biases to draw conclusions from the vast 
amount of data in the electronic databases.   
Qualitative research studies should be judged on the qualitative paradigm. 
Qualitative research is recognized and respected in its unique approach to terrorism 
(Qualitative Approaches, 2013). However, many critics believe that findings are often 
biases, which threatens the credibility of qualitative research. Also, critics believe this 
could be minimized if the researcher excludes personal opinions and beliefs. When 
analyzing the data, I compared NVivo and Microsoft workbook. 
Ethical Issues in the Use of Secondary Data Analysis Research 
Secondary data has disadvantages. When conducting secondary data analysis, 
consent from individuals should be obtained (Sringernyuang, n.d., p.1). Walden’s 
University approval and consent was required before I went forward with the data 
collection. Many times, the data originally collected for the study, may not be in the 
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original format and/or may be difficult to obtain the right of entry in a public domain 
database. Sringernyuang (n.d.) stated that, when gathering information from a public 
domain like RAND’s database, anyone could partake in secondary data analysis. There is 
a lack of guiding principles and actions reflecting ways to approach electronic collection 
data, which is susceptible to being plagiarized, changed, and removed; as well, the 
researcher’s data being misused, which unethical (Sringernyuang, n.d.). This study had 
no research participants. The main benefit of the study was that it was pre-designed, did 
not cost much, and was convenient.  
Those who may have questions or concerns may refer to Walden University’s 
research policies and guidelines. All of Walden University’s research policies and 
guidelines were adhered to because there was no plagiarizing or removing source data, or 
interpreting the results based on the need of my study. Findings from the research study 
cannot be generalized outside of U.S. territory. The public domain databases are open-
source and everyone has access on condition that the rules are followed.  
Summary 
A qualitative phenomenological design was used for this research study. The 
elements in this study comprised of secondary data collection; gathering data through 
secondary analysis; displaying pre-established levels of validity and reliability of the data 
collection and analysis method. In Chapter 4, I discussed the results of the study 
including the different typologies, dataset and database collection method, demographics, 
defining secondary data analysis, the data analysis process for themes and codes, the data 
analysis for excel workbook, and the summary. 
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Chapter 4: Results  
This study addressed the paradox between the considerable media attention lone 
wolf terrorism has received and the lack of examination attributed to the phenomenon. 
The purpose of the study was to explore the mechanisms and processes that lead 
individuals to be drawn to or away from an existing radical movement and to act 
unilaterally and without direction toward violent ends. 
Central Research Question and Sub questions 
What are the underlying mechanisms and processes that lead individuals to be 
drawn to or away from an existing radical movement and to act unilaterally and without 
direction toward violent ends? 
SQ1: What causes an individual to participate in lone wolf terrorism? 
SQ2: Are there consistent and significant indicators that can characterize a 
potential lone wolf actor? 
The RAND-MIPT Terrorism Knowledge database and the Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD) allowed me to gather and analyze data to describe the experiences of the 
lone wolf terrorist. Both RAND and the GTD have maintained databases on terrorism 
events dating back to the late 1960s and contain comprehensive information on domestic 
terrorism. Chapter 4 includes a description of the typologies of lone wolf terrorism, 
databases used, and data collection. I also present the demographics, data analysis 
process, results, evidence of trustworthiness, and a summary. 
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Typologies 
Numerous typologies illustrate lone wolf terrorism, yet research suggests no 
illustration can characterize the lone wolf terrorist. Lone wolf contact is at a minimum, if 
there is any contact at all, with other terrorists or terrorist organizations. These typologies 
provide contrasting perceptions of the lone wolf phenomenon (Bates, 2012):  
1. Extent of radicalization: A common trait of lone wolf terrorists is that they all 
self-radicalize, but the extent to which it is personal or social through outside 
influences is unknown. 
2. Inspiration: Those who are egoistic or self-centered and think they may be 
beyond the community and/or an ideological group.  
3. Form: The form of lone wolf terrorism may be a lone event or a continuous 
event. 
4. Risk activity: The degree of risk the lone wolf is willing to take. 
Pantucci (2011) also proposed a typology that identifies four types of lone wolf terrorists: 
1. Loners: Individuals who use Islamist ideology to provide cover for their 
attempted or carried out actions. Although they assert some devotion to 
extremist Islamic beliefs, they appear to have no contact at all with terrorist 
organizations besides the passive information on the Internet. 
2. Lone wolves: Individuals, who carry out actions on their own, but 
demonstrate little contact with terrorist operational extremists.  
3. Lone wolf packs: Individual cells of loners who self-radicalized.  
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4. Lone attackers: Individuals who operate on their own accord but show a direct 
link to terrorist organizations. 
Databases and Data Collection Method 
Secondary data collection was used in this study. Data collected for the study are 
available for public use. No data were collected until the final IRB approval was given on 
June 13, 2017 (IRB approval number 06-13-17-0307965). Data were collected and 
imported into NVivo from June 21, 2017 through July 23, 2017. No ethical issues arose 
because there was no plagiarizing or removal of source data. The data records were 
created to align with this study. Data were collected by exploring RAND and GTD 
databases for lone wolf terrorist incidents post 9/11 until December of 2016. The search 
involved lone wolf terrorist incidents in the United States and excluded any group 
terrorism acts.  
An act committed by an individual was marked other to identify a single person 
as opposed to a group in RAND’s database. The GTD used the label individual to 
designate a single perpetrator. RAND’s definition and criteria for incidents to be 
considered terrorism included the nature of the act, not the identity of the perpetrators or 
the nature of the cause; key elements included the following:  
• violence or the threat of violence,  
• calculated to create fear or alarm,  
• intended to coerce certain actions, 
• motive must include a political objective, 
• generally directed at civilian targets, and 
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• can be a group or individual (RAND, 2013 p. 1). 
For incidents to be included in the GTD, several parameters had to be met:  
The GTD defines a terrorist attack as the threatened or actual use of illegal force 
and violence by a non- state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or 
social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation. In practice, this means to 
consider an incident for inclusion in the GTD, all three of the following attributes 
must be present: The incident must be intentional—the result of a conscious 
calculation on the part of a perpetrator. The incident must entail some level of 
violence or immediate threat of violence—including property violence, as well as 
violence against people. The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national 
actors. The database does not include acts of state terrorism. In addition, at least 
two of the following three criteria must be present for an incident to be included 
in the GTD: The violent act was aimed at attaining a political, economic, 
religious, or social goal; The violent act included evidence of an intention to 
coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or 
audiences) other than the immediate victims; and the violent act was outside the 
precepts of International Humanitarian Law. (START, 2016, p.1)  
The following terms were searched in the databases to garner specific results: homegrown 
jihadist, lone wolf terrorism, domestic terrorism, loner, lone wolf, homegrown terrorist, 
lone wolf packs, and individual. 
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Codes 
Each record was analyzed in NVivo using text such as perpetrator, nationality of 
the victim, extremism, loner or lone wolves, the city and state, date, target, property, the 
mechanisms and ideology derived from the literature, and the indicators that describe the 
characteristics of the lone wolf terrorist. When I imported and analyzed these documents, 
these words frequently appeared more than others. For example, the word assailant 
appeared more often whereas arson appeared less often, as indicated by the font size in 
the word cloud. Figure 1 illustrates the text search in NVivo. 
Figure 1. NVivo text search. 
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Demographics 
There was a total of 341 terrorist incidents in the RAND and GTD databases from 
9/12/01 to 12/31/2016. However, only 177 incidents met the criteria for the study and 
multiple perpetrators committed multiple acts (see Figure 2). Other incidents were not 
included because the perpetrator was unknown and the databases recorded incidents until 
December of 2016. All incidents happened domestically. The perpetrators consisted of 10 
females or 6%, 131 males or 74%, and the gender of 31or 18% of perpetrators was 
unknown (see Figure 3). Out of the 177 incidents, 172 of those targets were of U.S. 
nationality, 1 was Chinese, and 1 Israeli, 1 Mexican, 1 Ireland, and 1 incident had 
multiple nationalities of people (see Figure 4). The perpetrators were involved in the acts 
(confessed or physically represented) and incidents were classified as domestic lone wolf 
terrorists.  
 
Figure 2. Total incidents (341) from 9/12/2001-12312016. 
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Figure 3. Basic demographics of the perpetrators.  
 
 
Figure 4. Nationality of targets. 
 
Pantucci’s (2011) typology characterized the different types of lone wolves in the 
study. The individuals were aligned regarding the acts committed and the proper 
descriptions of the individualized lone wolf. The lone wolves demonstrated some form of 
contact with operational extremists, yet, their acts were carried out alone and they 
appeared to be more disturbed individuals seeking consolation in extremist beliefs. The 
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loners did not appear to have any contact with operational extremists, and their acts 
seemed reactive at large to the passive information on the internet. 
Data Collection 
I reviewed chapters 1 through 3 focusing more on the research design. After 
assessing the research design, I used the preceding terms to search the databases resulting 
in74 total source documents, including testimonies, research reports, reviewed articles, 
and specific attacks. It took one month to collect the sources data and import it into 
NVivo. I began developing codes and themes to assist me with categorizing the data. 
Conducting research prior to data being imported into NVivo helped familiarize my 
conception of the sources as well as manage my time more efficiently. 
Defining Secondary Data Analysis 
Secondary data is the analysis of data that was collected by someone else 
(Boslaugh, 2007). Secondary data is used to explore alternative research questions from 
the original data that were collected. The process of coding and classifying themes 
involved steps, which were formed around my research questions. NVivo software was 
the primary tool used for coding and manual coding was secondary. This course of action 
helped examine and evaluate the analysis process, although it prolonged time. 
Steps of Secondary Data Analysis 
Portable Document Format (PDF) data were imported from the RAND and GTD 
databases. Likewise, I duplicated the digital word scripts and imported them into NVivo. 
When documents were not in PDF, NVivo would not import the document unless they 
were transcribed in a Word document. After all the sources were imported, I manually 
69 
 
coded the themes in the interim. I checked off the sources manually to avoid reproducing 
existing sources. I evaluated several codes and themes that emerged from the central and 
sub questions using PDF and digital word scripts documents. 
Data Analysis Process for Themes and Codes 
The data analysis process was used to support the research questions. This 
allowed me to gather the appropriate data which permitted me to answer the research 
questions adequately. After the theme and supporting data was coded I checked it off 
manually and I then returned to NVivo for more data coding applying the answers 
accordingly to the themes and foregoing categories. The answers were confirmed to 
obtain a representative sample.  
I then used coded groupings to further materialize the themes. I began with the 
prior themes that corresponded to each of the research questions: (a) individual 
mechanisms contribute to likely lone wolf terrorists and their process to a violent end; (b) 
the phenomenon of the domestic lone wolf terrorist is not limited to a movement. Rather, 
lone terrorists operate on the fringes of extremist movements, with such loose 
associations being connected to right-wing ideologies, inspired and fascinated by Islamist 
ideologies of Arabian Peninsula and The Islamic State of Iraq (AQAP) and Levant 
(ISIL), and self-developed ideologies facilitating violence based on political, religious, or 
social change; (c) and these indicators characterized the potential lone wolf terrorist. I 
replicated the steps for all the themes that emerged for each research question. The 
mechanisms theme stemmed from the coding answers in the central research question. 
The theme that lone wolf terrorists operate on the fringes of extremist movements was 
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determined based on the coding answers from sub question 1. The indicators that 
characterized lone wolves were developed from coding answers to sub question 2. 
Data Analysis Process for Excel Workbook 
I applied the same method of coding and analyzing data using the Excel 
workbook. The process was not detailed due to workbook features. Individually, each 
category was coded in no order:  
• perpetrator; 
• nationality of target; 
• extremism; 
• loner or lone wolves; 
• city-state; 
• date; 
• Ideologies- Rightwing (RW), Islamist (Al Qaida), and self-developed (SD); 
• Mechanisms-Personal and political grievance (PPG), Risk and status seeking 
(RS) and Unfreezing (Unfreezing); 
• Indicators- Internet (SM), Fixation (F), Radical expressions (RE);  
• Identification (I), and Pseudo spontaneous communication (PSC); 
• Target- (People or Property) and; 
• Property damage- (Yes or No) 
Once the Excel workbook was coded, I compared the data to ensure it was aligned 
correctly and that it matched information that was imported into NVivo. 
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Results 
I began by discussing the themes that corresponds the research questions: (a) 
individual mechanisms contribute to likely lone wolf terrorists and their process to a 
violent end; (b) the phenomenon of the domestic lone wolf terrorist is not limited to a 
movement. Rather, lone terrorists operate on the fringes of extremist movements; (c) and 
these indicators characterized the potential lone wolf terrorist. I will then provide 
examples associating with the theme that is being discussed. This will provide a further 
outline in for chapter 5 regarding the interpretation of findings, recommendation, and 
implication of the study. 
Central Research Question 
What are the underlying mechanisms and processes that lead individuals to be 
drawn to or away from an existing radical movement and to act unilaterally and without 
direction toward violent ends? There are three individual underlying mechanisms and 
processes that lead individuals to be drawn to or away from an existing radical 
movement: personal and political grievance, risk-and-status seeking, and unfreezing. 
Primary experienced mechanism. Personal and political grievance is a 
combination between the two and is the primary experienced mechanism of individual 
radicalization. Individuals believe some sort of injustice has occurred either to them or to 
society and they tend to form their own beliefs and ideologies. This materialized in 168 
out of 177 incidents or 95% and was inferred from three experiences (see Figure 5).  
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 Overall, the primary mechanisms that lead individuals to a violent end are one of 
the most significant developments of the study. Personal and political grievance appeared 
in numerous forms and was shown in ways such as individuals believing harm was 
inflicted upon them individually or to society, assuming the environment or humanity 
was being destroyed, and feeling like policies, laws, and/or regulations were unjust. Here 
are different examples of personal and or political grievance being demonstrated through 
violent acts: 
An assailant sent a message via Twitter to Kurt Eichenwald, a Newsweek 
journalist, in Dallas, Texas, United States. The message contained the text “you 
deserve a seizure for your posts” and a GIF image of a strobe. Edgar M. Welch 
stated that he targeted Comet Ping Pong because he suspected the human 
trafficking of children was occurring at the restaurant. Lakeem Keon Scott 
claimed responsibility for the incident and stated that he carried out the attack 
because he was upset with the deaths of African Americans by authorities in 
Figure 5. Mechanisms of individual radicalization.  
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Louisiana and Minnesota. Sanford stated that he targeted Trump because he 
believed “somebody had to stand up for America”. (GTD and RAND, 2017, p.1) 
Others believed harm was inflicted upon them individually or to society:  
Authorities arrested Dana Ericson, who confessed to the attack, self-identified as 
a white supremacist, and indicated that his goal was ethnic cleansing. In court, 
Ericson stated that he was trying to start a revolution. Robert Lewis Dear claimed 
responsibility for the incident and stated that he was a “warrior for the babies. 
Rasheed Abdul Aziz told the pastor that he had been sent by “Allah” to slay 
infidels. Hapner confessed to the arson and claimed that he was trying to 
“eradicate pornography.” (GTD and RAND, 2017, p.1)  
For instance, when individuals assumed the environment or humanity was been 
destroyed, random bombings took place as an example: 
At approximately 3:15 a.m. local time, seven firebombs were detonated at a 
newly constructed apartment complex in Sutter Creek, California, United States. 
Six of the firebombs were extinguished by the sprinkler system, but the seventh 
firebomb exploded and caused approximately $50,000 worth of damage to the 
complex, although no casualties resulted from this attack. The group Earth 
Liberation Front (ELF) claimed responsibility for this attack and subsequently 
three individuals were arrested and charged. Similarly, an assailant attempted to 
bomb a natural gas pipeline in Plano, Texas, United States and was critically 
injured. Sources note that Anson Chi identified as part of the anti-government 
Sovereign Citizen movement. (GTD and RAND, 2017, p.1) 
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Some of the individuals felt like policies, laws, and/or regulations were unjust. Case in 
point: 
A letter containing ricin was mailed to the Director of Mayors against Illegal 
Guns, Mark Glaze, in Washington, District of Columbia, United States. The letter 
warned of future attacks if Glaze and other gun control advocates pursued 
legislation to limit gun ownership. Joseph Stack flew his private plane into the 
IRS building. He had problems with the IRS in the past and believed violence was 
the only answer. Dwight Watson, a tobacco farmer from North Carolina, drove a 
tractor through the Constitution Gardens in Washington D.C., United States. 
Watson believed that the tobacco policies of the United States government were 
unfair to the tobacco farmer and he was trying to bring nationwide attention to the 
policies that he maintained ruined him financially. (GTD and RAND, 2017, p.1) 
 Second experience mechanism. Risk-and-status seeking individuals were 
devoted and inspired and/or fascinated by the teachings of Anwar Awlaki’s, Abu 
Muhammad al Adnani, and/or Osama bin Laden under al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
or The Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) for whom violence may seem the best path 
for respect. This materialized in 8 out of 177 incidents or 5% and was the second most 
experienced mechanism in the study (see Figure 5). 
The risk-and-status seeking individual mechanism of radicalization was 
demonstrated in numerous of cases. For instance: 
Security forces discovered and defused an explosive device in the Chelsea 
neighborhood of Manhattan, New York City, United States. The device was 
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discovered several blocks away from an explosion that occurred earlier the same 
day. Ahmad Khan Rahami claimed responsibility for this incident and three 
similar bombings that occurred between September 17 and September 18, 2016 in 
New York and New Jersey. Sources suspected that Rahami may have been 
inspired by Abu Muhammad al Adnani, a spokesperson for the Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Sources also noted that Rahami admired Osama bin 
Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki in his journal. (GTD and RAND, 2017, p.1) 
An assailant shot and killed John Bailey Clark Jr. and buried him in a grave outside his 
residence in Morganton, North Carolina, United States: 
No group claimed responsibility for the incident; however, sources attributed the 
attack to an individual, identified as Justin Nojan Sullivan. Sources posited that 
Sullivan, who was arrested in connection to the attack, targeted John Bailey Clark 
Jr. to steal money from the victim, so he could purchase a rifle to carry out an 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) inspired attack. (GTD and RAND, 
2017, p.1) 
Shots were fired at the Pentagon located in Arlington, Virginia, United States:  
Security reported hearing between five and seven shots fired at the building at 
4:55 am. No one was injured in the attack, but two windows were damaged. 
Yonathan Melaku, a Marine Corps reservist, was arrested on June 17, 2011, for an 
unrelated incident but was charged on June 21, 2011, for the Pentagon shooting 
and several other similar attacks in the area, including two shootings on the 
National Museum of the Marine Corps, and two at Marine Corps and Coast Guard 
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recruiting stations. Sources report that Melaku was fascinated by al-Qaeda, but 
did not claim to be a member of the organization. (GTD and RAND, 2017, p.1) 
 Third experience mechanism. Unfreezing is a personal crisis such as a mental 
disorder or illness that leaves an individual with less to lose and in search of new 
directions. This happened once out of the 177 incidents or 1% and was the least 
experienced mechanism (see Figure 5). One eccentric perpetrator left a note containing: 
A small pipe bomb put in a foam box was found in a Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 
United States mailbox. Police safely detonated the device, which was packed with 
nails, and no one was hurt. The bomb had a note that stated, “Free Palestine” and 
also reportedly made some reference to al-Qaeda. A 53-year-old Philadelphia 
man, Preston Lit, who had no connections with al-Qaeda or any other terrorist 
group, was charged with threatening to use explosives. He had a criminal past and 
reportedly suffered from bi-polar disorder and other mental sicknesses. (GTD and 
RAND, 2017, p.1)  
Sources noted the existence of mental illness should not be an indicator of limited 
rationality or reduced ability to plan and conduct an attack. The correlation of mental 
illness with lone wolf terrorists should not, therefore, be considered an indicator that a 
lone wolf terrorist presents a reduced threat; rather the findings are a further contribution 
toward understanding the phenomenon (GTD and RAND, 2017, p.1). 
Sub question 1 
What causes an individual to participate in lone wolf terrorism? There is no single 
profile of a lone wolf terrorist. As was stated earlier, usually it is combination between 
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personal and political grievances. It is extremely difficult to differentiate between 
individuals using terrorism because of personal and political grievances and those that are 
committed to an ideology. Sub question 1: includes right-wing ideologies (a); self-
developed ideologies (b); and Islamist ideologies (c). 
Primary experienced ideologies. The primary experienced ideology that 
developed from this study was right-wing ideology. Right-wing ideology refers to a 
person or group who holds extreme or fanatical political or religious views, especially 
one who resorts to or advocates extreme actions without organizational assistance. This 
occurred in 78 out 177 incidents, or 44% and was inferred from 13 right-wing extremist 
ideological movements (see Figure 6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Largely for sub research question 1 and the second significant theme, domestic 
lone wolf terrorists are not limited to a movement; rather, lone terrorists operate on the 
                                     Figure 6. Right-wing ideology extremists. 
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fringes of extremist movements. This was the most profound, volatile, and rebellious 
form of terrorism associated with a lone wolf in this study. But, only four will be 
discussed because they had eight or more incidents: anti-government extremists; anti-
Muslim extremists; white extremists; and anti-abortion extremists.  
Anti-government right-wing extremist sees the government as the enemy and use 
violence as a result.  
For example: 
An assailant opened fire on a federal courthouse in Austin, Texas, United States. 
This was one of three attacks carried out by the assailant that targeted government 
and security buildings in the city. Sources suspected that anti-government and 
anti-immigration sentiments fueled the incidents. (GTD and RAND, 2017, p.1) 
The anti-Muslim extremist movement is a new phenomenon. Many of these attacks begin 
post 9/11 and extreme aggression is shown toward Muslims individuals. The perpetrators 
who oppose Muslims see Islam as the fundamental reason for their inherent behavior.  
For instance: 
An assailant assaulted a Muslim store clerk at Fatima Food Mart in Queens, New 
York City, United States. The clerk was injured in the attack. The assailant, 
identified as Piro Kolvani, said, “I kill Muslims” during the attack and was later 
arrested.” (GTD and RAND, 2017, p.1)  
White supremacists believe they are superior to all other races and some perpetrators 
demonstrated their experience in the following ways: 
79 
 
On Wednesday afternoon at approximately 12:40, in Washington, District of 
Columbia., United States, an assailant armed with a rifle entered the National 
Holocaust Memorial Museum and fired upon civilians, killing one security guard, 
Stephen Tyrone, and injuring an unknown number of civilians. The shooter was 
wounded critically in the attack and identified as white supremacist, James W. 
von Brunn. Officials believe the attack may have been politically motivated. 
(GTD and RAND, 2017, p.1)  
The anti-abortion movements are individuals or groups who believe abortion is unethical 
and that violence is justified against people and establishments providing abortion 
services. These begin as counter-movements and then they developed into acts such as 
the following: 
An assailant opened fire on a Planned Parenthood clinic and held an unknown 
number of people hostage for five hours in Colorado Springs, Colorado, United 
States. At least three people were killed and nine other people were wounded in 
the assault. An individual, identified as Robert Lewis Dear, claimed responsibility 
for the incident and stated that he was a “warrior for the babies.” (GTD and 
RAND, 2017, p.1) 
Second experienced ideologies (single-issue protest). Self-developed ideology (single-
issue protest) is when the individual takes steps in advocating or adopting an extremist 
belief to facilitate ideologically-based violence to advance political, religious, or social 
change. This second experienced ideology materialized from sub question 1 and 
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materialized in 67 out 177 incidents or 38% (see Figure 7), and was led by unknown 
extremist and the Earth Liberation Front.  
 
 
Figure 7. Self-developed ideology extremists. 
 
When trying to illustrate the lone wolf terrorist, it is difficult because often pieces they do 
not come with warning signs. Their extremism, if any exists, appears to be unknown. For 
example: 
An assailant set fire to a residence in Endicott, New York, United States. The 
offender placed gasoline-filled cans throughout the house as obstacles and spray-
painted the anti-police message “lie with pigs, fry like bacon” on an exterior wall 
of the house before starting the blaze. The family sleeping inside the house 
escaped, and no injuries were reported. No group claimed responsibility; 
however, authorities arrested and charged firefighter Jason T. Stokes with starting 
the fire at his own house.” (GTD and RAND, 2017, p.1) 
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The Earth Liberation Front (ELF) uses “economic” sabotage and guerilla warfare to stop 
the exploitation and destruction of the environment. In 2001, the ELF was classified as 
the top domestic terror threat to the United States by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations. These autonomous individuals continue to conduct attacks every so often. 
For instance:  
Grant Barnes, suspected affiliated with the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), planted 
an incendiary device under a parked 1996 Chevrolet Tahoe in the driveway of 
Josh and Jennifer Rudolph’s home in the Cherry Creek neighborhood of Denver, 
Colorado in the United States. The SUV sustained heavy fire damage, but there 
were no casualties in the incident. Two more devices were discovered, targeting 
other SUVs in the area on this day. These were three in a series of seven 
firebombs which Barnes planted in the Cherry Creek area, targeting SUVs over 
the course of four days. Barnes was arrested on March 22, 2007, indicted, and 
pled guilty in July 2007, and sentenced to 12 years in prison. (GTD and RAND, 
2017, p.1) 
Third experienced ideologies. Individuals used Islamist ideologies that were 
inspirational, fascinating, and devoted to the teachings of Abu Muhammad al Adnani, 
Anwar Awlaki’s, in Osama bin Laden in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and The Islamic 
State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) to commit violent acts. The third experienced ideology 
materialized as well from sub question 1(see Figure 8), and had 32 occurrences out 177 
incidents, or 18%. The two extremisms that materialized the most from Islamist ideology 
were Jihadi-inspired extremists and Muslim extremists. 
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Jihadi-inspired extremists refer to Islamic extremism occurring within the United 
States. Islamic extremism is adherence to a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, 
potentially using violence to achieve political goals. Ali Muhammad Brown was one of 
the: 
assailants that shot and killed Brendan Tevlin as he was stopped at a traffic signal 
in West Orange, New Jersey, United States. Police later arrested three suspects, 
including Ali Muhammad Brown, in connection with the case. Authorities claim 
that Brown committed the act to punish the United States for its involvement in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. Brown has been indicted on murder charges in connection 
with two separate attacks that occurred earlier in the year in Skywalk and Seattle, 
which are both located in the state of Washington. (GTD and RAND, 2017, p.1) 
Figure 8. Islamist ideology extremists. 
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Muslim extremists perceive any form of Islam that opposes “democracy,” the rule of law, 
individual liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. This 
was identified when: 
An assailant opened fire on a military recruiting office in Chattanooga, 
Tennessee, United States. There were no reported casualties resulting from the assault. 
This was one of two attacks carried out by the same assailant within a short period of 
time; after targeting the office, the assailant attacked a military training center in the area. 
No group claimed responsibility for the incidents; however, the assailant was later 
identified as Mohammad Youssuf Abdulazeez. (GTD and RAND, 2017, p.1) 
Sub question 2 
Are there consistent and significant indicators that can characterize a potential 
lone wolf actor? In characterizing the lone wolf terrorist, there are several indicators: 
gender, the internet, radical expressions, pseudo spontaneous communication, fixation, 
and identification. However, only pseudo spontaneous communication, fixation, 
identification, and radical expressions were discussed because they had eight or more 
incidents. 
Primary experienced indicator. Pseudo spontaneous communication involves 
the intentional and strategic manipulation of some formal display(s). Individuals will 
attack a mosque or another symbolic display to express their personal and or political 
grievance towards an object or person, sending a message to infuriate others. Pseudo 
spontaneous communication materialized in 71 out of 177 incidents or 40%. This 
emerged from sub question 2 (see Figure 9). 
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Overall, pseudo spontaneous communication was shown to be a consistent 
indicator of the lone wolf. The incidents are an important way for individuals to get their 
message across and contain important information from the “individual” perspective. 
This theme is defined by the nature of the act, not the identity of the perpetrator or the 
nature of the cause, and was reflected in the following incidents below: 
An assailant set fire to the Islamic Center mosque in Fort Pierce, Florida, United 
States. There were no reported casualties in the attack. Joseph Michael Schreiber 
was arrested and claimed responsibility for the incident. An explosive device 
detonated in a Rainbow Times newspaper box in Salem, Massachusetts, United 
States. There were no reported casualties in the blast. No group claimed 
responsibility for the incident. (GTD and RAND, 2017, p.1)  
Figure 9. Indicators characterizing the lone wolf. 
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 Second experienced indicator. Fixation is being obsessed with a person or cause 
and it was subsequent to pseudo spontaneous communication with 57 out 177 incidents, 
or 32% (see Figure 9). These incidents tend to play out in numerous ways and they seem 
to be focused on societal issues like the two-described underneath: 
An unknown anti-police extremist group claimed responsibility for the incident in 
a note left at the scene and stated, “Black Lives Matter” while also mentioning 
Alton Sterling and Philando Castile.” An assailant also opened fire on New York 
City Police Department officers while they were sitting in their vehicle in 
Bedford-Stuyvesant neighborhood, Brooklyn, New York City, United States. 
Officers Wenjian Liu and Rafael Ramos were killed in the attack. The assailant, 
identified as Ismaaiyl Brinsley, claimed responsibility and stated that the attack 
was carried out to avenge the deaths of Michael Brown and Eric Garner at the 
hands of the authorities.  
 Third experienced indicator. Identification is the willingness of the attacker to 
commit violence as an agent of a belief system. This occurred in 27 out 177 incidents, or 
15% (see Figure 9). Because identification is an indicator that leads individuals to violent 
ends, this suggests the individual’s behavior is driven by components of social identity 
like in such cases below: 
Three assailants armed with knives attacked a group of Hispanic teenagers 
playing soccer at Stephen Sorensen Park in Lake Los Angeles, California, United 
States. At least two people suffered minor injuries in the assault. The three 
assailants, identified as Ian Justine Plankey, Richard Lawrence Daulton, and 
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Kevin Matthew Stewart, were arrested following the incident. During the attack, 
they shouted white supremacist statements and racial slurs, including “Heil Hitler, 
AV Skins.” Furthermore, an assailant attacked a police patrol with a hatchet in 
Queens, New York City, United States. The assailant was killed and two officers 
and a bystander were wounded in the attack. Zale Thompson, a convert to Islam, 
was responsible for the incident. (GTD and RAND, 2017, p.1)  
 Fourth experienced indicator. Individuals frequently use radical expressions in 
social media, blog postings, and alternate forums to express their personal and or political 
beliefs. This materialized under sub question 2, showing 16 out of 177 incidents, or 9% 
(see Figure 9). For example: 
Sources identified the assailant as Gavin Long and while his specific motive is 
unknown, Long’s social media presence indicated that the attack may have been 
related to racial tensions. On social media, the assailants expressed radical views 
and decried the federal government, taxes, anti-gun laws, and demanded a 
revolution. In another attack, both assailants identified as Syed Rizwan Farook 
and Tashfeen Malik, fled the scene but were located and killed in a shootout with 
police the later the same day. Tashfeen malik pledged allegiance to the leader of 
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) on social media on the day of the 
attack. ISIL referenced the assailants as ‘soldiers of the caliphate.’ However, 
sources did not report a connection between the assailants and ISIL. 
87 
 
Evidence of Trustworthiness 
Trustworthiness consisted of several components in this study: (a) Credibility: 
ethical issues and principles were adhered to because all source document data remained 
the primary source; (b) Transferability: is trustworthy because data were imported 
directly into NVivo precisely; (c) Dependability: the dependability of the study 
materialized from 74 sources, which, in turn, produced 177 perpetrators from testimonies, 
research reports, and reviewed articles; (d) and Intra Coder-Reliability: an intra-coder 
technique was a more effective way to convey and transform the personal experience of 
individuals from their personal perspective, challenging fundamental beliefs (Creswell, 
2009). 
Credibility 
As for the credibility of my phenomenological research study, all potential ethical 
issues and principles were adhered to because all the source document data remained the 
primary source, and there was no plagiarizing, copying, or removing of the data. I used 
the research data to examine a correlation primary and secondary data to carrying out the 
research. The purpose was to ensure the studies questions were aligned with my research 
questions, and that the primary data collection and analytic techniques were applied to the 
secondary analysis (Northern Arizona University, 2013). Secondary data helped create 
my research design and it provided an outline to which secondary data analysis was 
compared. 
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Transferability 
Transferability is conveyable because data were imported directly into NVivo 
precisely. The data gathered from the source documents were coded and schematized. 
Because of the substantial amount of information available, secondary data analysis 
displayed pre-established levels of validity and reliability, which do not have to be 
examined again by the researcher if he or she has plans to re-use the information 
(Sringernyuang, n.d.). 
Dependability 
The dependability of the study materialized from 74 sources, which, in turn, 
produced 177 perpetrators from testimonies, research reports, and review articles that met 
stringent criteria for it to be categorized as lone wolf terrorism in this study. This study 
had no research participants. The main benefit of the study could assist national security 
officials and intelligence agencies in identifying lone wolf individuals, weighing the 
actual threat versus the perception, developing better counterterrorism strategies for the 
lone wolf phenomenon. Programs like NVivo are commonly used and make data more 
manageable to analyze, record, and edit. The data was manually coded in addition so that 
I was comfortable engaging with the data. 
Intra-Coder Reliability 
An intra-coder technique was a more effective way to convey and transform the 
personal experience of individuals into their personal perspective, challenging 
fundamental beliefs (Creswell, 2009). Most importantly, this dimension to the research 
study enabled me to use it as a foundation for a real-world theory, allowing it to advise, 
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assist, or contest course of action (McNabb, 2010). Although data were limited and 
researchers and scholars talk about their perception of the lone wolf terrorist through 
group terrorism studies, studies that disassociate the lone wolf from the group 
phenomenon can define their exact experiences, obstacles, and benefits. 
Summary 
The objective of chapter 4 was to provide analysis and exploration of qualitative 
data with 177 incidents of lone wolf incidents in the United States post 9/11. The results 
were discussed in detail through the lenses of the perpetrators for which the lone wolf 
actions are set in motion, ultimately leading to a violent end. A qualitative 
phenomenological design was used via secondary analytical method. 
The findings support that there are three individual-level underlying mechanisms 
and processes (personal and political grievance, risk and status seeking, unfreezing) that 
lead individuals to be drawn to or away from an existing radical movement and to act 
unilaterally and without direction toward violent ends. The phenomenon of the domestic 
lone wolf terrorist is not limited to a movement. Rather, lone terrorists operate on the 
fringes of extremist movements, with such loose associations being connected to right-
wing ideologies, inspired and fascinated by Islamist ideologies of Arabian Peninsula and 
The Islamic State of Iraq (AQAP) and Levant (ISIL), and self-developed ideologies 
facilitating violence based on political, religious, or social change. There were several 
indicators to characterize the lone wolf terrorist: gender, the internet, fixation, 
identification, and pseudo spontaneous communication. In chapter 5 I advance the 
discussion, conclusion, and give recommendations. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
The purpose of this study was to explore the lone wolf phenomenon apart from 
other types of political violence and terrorism using the RAND-MIPT Terrorism 
Knowledge Base and the Global Terrorism Database. Data were collected for this study 
through the gathering of testimonies, research reports, reviewed articles, and specified 
attacks. This study was guided by the central research question: What are the underlying 
mechanisms and processes that lead individuals to be drawn to or away from an existing 
radical movement and to act unilaterally and without direction toward violent ends? 
Additionally, two sub questions were explored: What causes an individual to participate 
in lone wolf terrorism? Are there consistent and significant indicators that can 
characterize a potential lone wolf actor?  
 The three main themes addressed the three research questions in the study. First, 
results indicated that personal and political grievance, risk and status seeking, and 
unfreezing were the major mechanisms and processes of lone wolf terrorism. Second, 
right-wing ideology extremist movements, Islamist ideology extremist movements, and 
self-developed ideology extremist movements were the primary causes of domestic 
terrorism. Third, men were more likely to be involved in lone wolf incidents using formal 
displays, fixation, and venting radical expressions. 
The central research question was answered via the results from the primary 
question and the sub questions. Regarding how mechanisms and processes have 
influenced the domestic terrorist, a central finding indicated that there was no single 
profile to characterize the domestic lone wolf. Instead, personal and group grievance, as 
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well as a self-developed ideology, allows the domestic terrorist to lie dormant and 
undetected. However, although grievances are a part of the process, gender is a major 
indicator. The findings indicated that domestic lone wolf terrorist acts are not always 
large, yet they cause considerable damage to the government and the populace. 
Interpretation of Findings 
I conducted a phenomenological study to explore, identify, and describe the 
experiences of lone wolf terrorists through 177 domestic lone wolf terrorist incidents. 
The study addressed the paradox between the considerable media attention lone wolf 
terrorism has received and the lack of formal study of the phenomenon. The study was 
designed to answer one central research question and two sub questions. This section 
provides an interpretation of the findings for the central research question, Sub question 
1, and Sub question 2. 
Central Research Question 
This study was guided by the central research question: What are the underlying 
mechanisms and processes that lead individuals to be drawn to or away from an existing 
radical movement and to act unilaterally and without direction toward violent ends? The 
findings suggested that the underlying mechanisms and processes of the domestic lone 
wolf terrorist acting alone are not the same as thinking autonomously. The individual’s 
mental process must be oppressed or he or she must be grieving personally or politically. 
Lone wolf terrorists are risk- and status-seeking individuals who are inspired and/or 
fascinated by different ideologies for which violence may seem the best path to gain 
respect. Mental illness may or may not play a role in the act, and the disconnection leaves 
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an individual with less to lose and in search of new directions. This allows the domestic 
terrorist to lie dormant and undetected. However, gender does play a major role.  
 Personal and political grievances can transfix the lone wolf terrorist’s thought 
process. For instance, the thought process of an anti-Muslim extremist believing that 
Islam is the inherent cause for their acts and a Muslim extremist believing that the wars 
are an attack on Islam weighs heavily upon them. Anti-Muslim extremist perspectives on 
Islam and Muslim extremist perspectives on the wars were created individually, but they 
did not manifest autonomously. When individuals act alone and are motivated by a larger 
movement, they fill a personal and/or social-political void. The effects of personal and 
political grievance be a precursor or mechanism to a violent end.  
 Risk- and status-seeking individuals who see violence as the best path to effect 
change align their beliefs to match their actions. The actions are believed to be justified, 
and it is the irrational thought-provoking process that ultimately leads to violent ends. 
Lone wolf terrorists seek respect and status, and they will risk everything to achieve 
prominence even if leads to a violent end. Lone wolves identify with certain movements 
and feel that the act represents the movement they are associating themselves with. The 
risk- and status-seeking process is another form of mechanism. 
 The unfreezing process cannot be simplified to a mental disconnect. In the event, 
the lone wolf must commit the act. The media likes to attribute terrorist acts to some type 
of mental illness. Individuals dealing with a personal crisis or who have a mental illness 
are more likely to be portrayed as terrorist although one percent of these individual are 
lone wolf terrorist. During the process of searching for a new direction, these individuals 
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attached themselves to a movement or to another external component or outside 
influence. The movement or external component is a mechanism that forms in the 
process.  
 The results from the central research question were consistent with the Global 
Terrorism Trend analysis report. In the report, Pajunen (2017) stated 
The process of individual transformation into a lone wolf terrorist contains an 
immeasurable number of interacting factors. These factors differ from individual 
to individual as psychologies and experiences are never the same between two 
individuals. However, a commonality between every single lone wolf terrorist is 
that they underwent a process. (p. 12)  
Very few individuals radicalize to the point of violent endings; to take the thought and 
transform it into action is difficult, and the need to avoid being caught it is even harder 
because they do not have assistance (Pantucci, Ellis, & Chaplais, 2017). 
There is a consensus in terrorism literature that it is impossible to profile lone 
wolf terrorists. When looking at any large database of perpetrators, the conclusion is 
often that they are drawn from across society, age group, and even gender. Nonetheless, 
accepting this limitation, important insights can be gained from this literature (Pantucci et 
al., 2017). 
Sub question 1 
Sub question 1 was as follows: What causes an individual to participate in lone 
wolf terrorism? The findings of Sub question 1 indicated that extremist movements and 
ideologies are a major cause of individuals participating in lone wolf terrorism. 
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Individuals are different, and so are the forms of movements. The rise of the self-
developed lone wolf has created a problem that continues to puzzle national security 
officials. Right-wing and Islamist extremist ideologies are common causes among the 
self-developed lone wolf in the leaderless resistance theory.  
The theme and experiences that materialized from Sub question 1 included lone 
wolf terrorists operating on the fringes of extremist movements with loose associations to 
right-wing ideologies, including individuals inspired and fascinated by Islamist 
ideologies of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and The Islamic State of Iraq (ISIL), and 
those with self-developed ideologies who commit violence based on political, religious, 
or social beliefs. Lone wolf terrorist seems to have reemerged in the later part of the 20th 
century by right-wing, Islamic, and other types of extremists. Unlike a terrorist group, 
lone wolves are hard to counter. Though they may not have organizational support, their 
chances of being caught are less risky and their liabilities decrease than if they were in a 
group (Bates, 2012). Bates (2012) also mentioned that “Though lone wolf terrorists self-
radicalized, their motivation may not always be political or religious. Lone wolf terrorists 
may be motivated by personal agendas in response to some real or perceived 
organizational event” (p.4). 
Sub question 2 
Sub question 2 was as follows: Are there consistent and significant indicators that 
can characterize a potential lone wolf actor? The findings of sub question 2 consist of 
several indicators: gender, the internet, radical expressions, fixation, identification, and 
pseudo spontaneous communication. There are signs for help before violence erupts, yet, 
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the signs are overlooked until after the act has occurred. The “See Something, Say 
Something” media campaign is an important part in the fight against lone wolf terrorism. 
The theme that materialized the most in what significant indicators can characterize a 
lone wolf terrorist show pseudo spontaneous communication as the major indicator for 
sub question 2.  
Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano cautioned that lone wolf terrorism 
may be rising sooner than later. The current attacks are on a smaller scale now, 
but, with the rise of lone wolf activities, it is only a matter of time before the big 
boom occurs. Therefore, when individuals spontaneously act, they are most 
difficult to prevent and there is nothing to intercept communication wise (Simon, 
2013).  
The day of the Boston bombings was not the first time the FBI had heard of 
Tamerlan Tsarnaev. A “foreign government” had asked the bureau to investigate him 
early in 2011, warning that he was a follower of radical Islam. In the case of Hasan, the 
warnings were also there. Hasan made statements justifying homicide bombings, spewed 
anti-American hatred, and reached out to al-Qaeda (Simon, 2013, p.1). Where the most 
attention, help, and funding is needed is either not a top priority or they simply refuse to 
acknowledge the growing threat of the lone wolf phenomenon. Past behavior should be 
analyzed to see where the catalysts lie (Simeon, 2010). 
Reflections 
I knew the lone wolf was a reemerging phenomenon. I also knew that research 
was limited regarding the phenomenon and that most work pertaining to the lone wolf 
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was discovered through organizational terrorism. My desire to explore and gain insight 
into the lone wolf terrorist while contributing to the body of literature was very 
motivational for me. Although I had a sampling methodology idea for the 
representativeness of the study, that idea changed when new themes and codes emerged 
during the analyzing process.  
More research needs to be conducted on the phenomenon of lone wolf terrorism. 
This is not a once for all study on domestic lone wolf terrorism, but it does provide a 
practical framework for the mechanisms and processes that the lead individuals to be 
drawn to and/or away from a violent end. What this study does not do is provide relative 
case analysis within the design of the study. To get a better understanding of the domestic 
lone wolf, case analysis should be applied to this study explanation. The domestic lone 
wolf will continue to be a fanatic, as there will always be a need counter the threat. 
Limitations of the Study 
In chapter 1, I discussed the limitations of the study the term ‘terrorism’ itself. 
Terrorism is defined several ways and it depends on the personnel, agency, state, or 
country. I used RAND and the GTD definitions for the study; however, others define it 
differently. I used phenomenological design composing 177 incidents that took place in 
the U.S. post 9/11. These incidents may not give an accurate representation of acts in 
other countries. In addition, the results may not reflect beyond the individual’s experience 
in the study or be comparable to other populaces of lone wolf terrorists. When looking at 
any large database of perpetrators, the conclusion is drawn from across society, age 
group, and even gender. Nonetheless, important insights can be gained from this 
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literature. Future research should mirror previous studies, but different questions will 
likely garner different results using the same research method. 
Recommendations 
Research on lone wolf terrorists is sparse and group analysis is used to describe 
and reflect the lone wolf terrorist experience. I took the sparse data that was available and 
added to the collection of research. One recommendation I suggest is to continue 
secondary analysis of previous studies because there is pre-established levels of validity 
and reliability and the study was pre-designed. I caution profiling these individuals or 
creating typologies because there is no model that fits all perpetrators. Researching more 
into the extremisms and the subgroups of lone wolves could prove beneficial from their 
unique profiles. Lone wolves that have a mental illness should not be a sole indicator or 
viewed as a reduced threat. In the least, it should be looked upon as further value toward 
the comprehension of the lone wolf terrorist.  
I recommend gaining access to a larger pool of perpetrators to obtain further 
diverse perspectives and experiences. The research that is currently available is unique 
and opportunities exist to advance value to this reemerging phenomenon. The process of 
radicalization and the perpetrators should continue to be a central focus. As the threat 
emerges, so will the different types of perpetrators and experiences of everyone 
(Pantucci, Ellis, & Chaplais, 2016). Further research on Internet radicalization should be 
conducted because the role of the internet and how it guides individuals to carry out the 
act shows that it is a powerful tool for lone terrorist. Websites are virtual training rooms, 
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offering numerous of things such as firing missiles, making bombs, and raising morale 
within oneself. 
Implications 
The findings could assist national security officials and intelligence agencies in 
identifying lone wolf individuals, weighing the actual threat versus the perception, 
developing better counterterrorism strategies for the lone wolf phenomenon, and 
enhancing relations with outside agencies. This is not just a national security problem, 
and all elements, locally and statewide, are needed to reduce the threat. Local and 
statewide officials are first responders and are in position to assist the government. 
The literature implicates further research should be implemented around personal 
and political grievance, right-wing ideologies, and the significant indicators. Those who 
are grieving feel that an injustice has occurred to them or in society, and the grievance 
carries over into actions. This significant development could possibly lead to why other 
violent crimes are committed. Right-wing ideology findings further implicated that these 
individuals are more likely to commit domestic terrorist acts than Islamist or self-
developed terrorists. Focusing on right-wing subgroups could give a more accurate 
account than generalizing the concept of all right-wing groups.  
No specific indicators can characterize the potential lone wolf terrorist. But things 
like spontaneous communication, radical expressions, and being preoccupied by a cause 
or person could drive the point home. The act is intentional and the type of target lone 
wolves attack tells a story. However, judging a book by the cover leads to invalid 
analysis and invalid conclusions. The reality is that it is hard to quantify anything with 
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lone wolf terrorism.   
The three significant developments can set the stage for radical movements within 
lone wolf terrorist. The developments are large enough to include in the body of research, 
yet, precise enough to put into context detailed aspects on the lone wolf mechanisms and 
processes (Pajunen, 2013). Adopting extremist views is not just a Muslim’s prerogative; 
it can be anyone’s prerogative as was demonstrated in the study. The intricate nature of 
these developments in the study reaffirms the compound process of being drawn to or 
away from violent ends. The reemergence of the domestic lone wolf will continue and 
merits further research. This study provides another framework for the radicalization 
process of the lone wolf. 
Implications for Social and Policy Change 
If national security official’s focus on mental health or mental illness, the fear of 
lone wolves should be of no concern, on the other hand exaggerating the phenomenon 
may be. The problem is that the threat of lone wolves is creating a real impact, certainly 
calculated, by facilitating policy change in the United States, and burdening relationships 
causing a distrust between communities and law enforcement. The fear of Muslims is 
rising in the United States. Post 9/11 attacks against Muslim or their properties have 
increased. 
The fundamental challenge of national security and politics is peril to our basic 
liberties. Right-wing ideological extremist are problems and causes of lone wolf terrorism 
in the United States. The fear of terrorism and Muslims has created more anti-immigrant 
politicians despite a low number of attacks from Islamist ideology extremist. A 
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significant measure involves conformity: the less they grieve about injustices, the more 
likely they will be in accord to existing social standards, outlooks, and customs.  
Having outside relations with other agencies and the community can reduce 
inspirations to act violently and promote cooperation across the board. The measures 
listed above, whether single-handedly or in grouping, do not prevent lone wolf acts. But 
it does make them more likely to be exposed in the process, less dangerous when not 
found and less efficient after an attack. They are critical for reducing lone wolf acts, 
which makes the phenomenon less probable and less perilous. 
Conclusion 
This study addressed the paradox between the considerable media attention lone 
wolf terrorism has received and the lack of sufficient examination attributed to the 
phenomenon by exploring, identifying, and describing the mechanisms and processes that 
lead individuals to be drawn to or away from an existing radical movement and to act 
unilaterally and without direction toward violent ends. Downing and Mayer (2013) 
asserted that lone wolves are more dangerous than an established terrorist hierarchy, 
which lets them act upon a situation that plays out in their minds. These indicators are 
more than enough to pose a huge threat to national security based upon the mystique of 
the threat.  
Findings for the central research question and sub questions revealed that there 
are three individual-level underlying mechanisms and processes (personal and political 
grievance, risk and status seeking, unfreezing), the phenomenon of the domestic lone 
wolf terrorist is not limited to a movement. Rather, lone terrorists operate on the fringes 
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of extremist movements, with such loose associations being connected to right-wing 
ideologies, inspired and fascinated by Islamist ideologies of Arabian Peninsula and The 
Islamic State of Iraq (AQAP) and Levant (ISIL), and self-developed ideologies 
facilitating violence based on political, religious, or social change. The findings also 
suggest that gender, the internet, fixation, identification, and pseudo spontaneous 
communication are some of the indicators that characterize the potential lone wolf 
terrorist.  
The purpose of this study was to focus on the phenomenon apart from other types 
of political violence and terrorism, using the RAND and GTD databases. Using the 
leaderless resistance theory, the bearing of this theory was found upon ideological 
inclusiveness that leaderless resistance advocates. Although leaderless resistance is used 
to shun detection, penetration, and execution by the government, ideological 
inclusiveness can be an advantage for individuals involved in groups (Joosse, 2007).  
There is no winning with the American public. Countering domestic lone wolf 
terrorism is difficult and is easier said than done. My desire to gain insight into the 
perspectives of the lone wolf and having the ability to contribute to the body of literature 
was very motivational for me. While the research currently available is unique, 
opportunities exist to add value to this reemerging phenomenon. More importantly, the 
findings could assist national security officials and intelligence agencies in identifying 
lone wolf individuals, weighing the actual threat versus the perception, developing better 
counter strategies for the lone wolf phenomenon, and enhancing relations with outside 
agencies and the citizens of the United States. 
102 
 
References 
Acharya, U. D. (2013). War on terror or terror wars: The problem in defining terrorism. 
International Law & Policy, 37, 653.  
Agbiboa, D. (2013). The Nigerian burden: Religious identity, conflict and the current 
terrorism of Boko Haram. Conflict, Security & Development, 13(1), 1-29. 
doi:10.1080/14678802.2013.770257 
Albrecht, J. F. (2011). The NYPD success story: Crime reduction and narcotics 
enforcement. Pakistan Journal of Criminology, 3(2), 83-94.  
Alexander, K. P. (2009). A review of Marc Sageman. Leaderless jihad: Terror networks 
in the twenty-first century. Terrorism & Political Violence, 21(4), 639-642. 
doi:10.1080/09546550903256655 
Alleged Fort Hood plotter thwarted by operational mistakes. (2011). Stratford Analysis, 
84.  
Altheide, D. L. (2006). Terrorism and the Politics of Fear. Cultural Studies? Critical 
Methodologies, 6(4), 415-439. 
Andrews, J. (2009). The lone wolf killer. Counter Terrorist, 2(4), 6-12.  
Anti-Defamation League (2013). Extremism in America. Retrieved from 
http://archive.adl.org/Learn/ext_us/Hoskins.asp?LEARN_Cat=Extremism&LEA
RN_Sub Cat=Extremism_in_America&xpicked=2&item=Hoskins 
Arndt, M. C. (2011). Leaderless jihad: Terror networks in the twenty-first century. Air 
and Space Power Journal, 25(4), 114-115.  
103 
 
Asal, V. H., Ackerman, G. A., & Rethemeyer, R (2012). Connections can be toxic: 
Terrorist organizational factors and the pursuit of CBRN weapons. Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism, 35(3), 229-254. doi:10.1080/1057610X.2012.648156 
Bakker, E., & De Graaf, B. (2010, November). Lone wolves. How to prevent this 
phenomenon? Expert Meeting Lone Wolves. The Hague, Netherlands: 
International Centre for Counter-Terrorism.  
Bakker, E., & De Graaf, B. (2011). Preventing lone wolf terrorism: Some CT approaches 
addressed. Perspectives on Terrorism, 5(5-6). 
Bárcena-Martín, E., Imedio-Olmedo, L., & Martín-Reyes, G. (2007). Inequality and 
deprivation within and between groups: An illustration of European Union countries. 
Journal of Economic Inequality, 5(3), 323-337. doi:10.1007/s10888-006-9046-4 
Barnes, B. D. (2012). Confronting the one-man wolf pack: Adapting law enforcement 
and prosecution responses to the threat of lone wolf terrorism. Boston University 
Law Review, 92(1), 1614-1662. 
Basibuyuk, O., Karakus, O., & Akdogan, H. (2007). Fundamentalism as a universal 
mindset case study of religious fundamentalism: Turkish Hezbollah. 
Understanding Terrorism: Analysis of Sociological & Psychological Aspects, 
22(1), 42-50. 
Bates, R. A. (2012). Dancing with wolves: Today’s lone wolf terrorists. The Journal of 
Public and Professional Sociology, 4(1) 1-15.  
Bergen, P., & Hoffman, B. (2010). Assessing the terrorist threat: A report of the 
Bipartisan Policy Center’s National Security Preparedness Group. Retrieved from 
104 
 
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/NSPG%20Final%20Threat%20Asses
sment.pdf 
Beutel, A. J. (2007). Radicalization and homegrown terrorism in western Muslim 
communities: Lessons learned for America. Retrieved from 
http://www.minaret.org/MPAC%20Backgrounder.pdf  
Bjelopera, J. P. (2011). America jihadist terrorism: Combating a complex threat. 
International Journal of Terrorism & Political Hot Spots, 6(3), 339-476.  
Bjelopera, J. P. (2012). The domestic terrorist threat: Background and issues for 
Congress. Congressional Research Service: Report, 1-66. 
Boaz, G. (2010). Defining terrorism: Is one man’s terrorist another man’s freedom 
fighter? Police Practice and Research, 3(4), 287-304.  
Boslaugh, S. (2007). Secondary data sources for public health: A practical guide. New 
York, NY: Cambridge. 
Breckenridge, J. N., Zimbardo, P. G., & Sweeton, J. L. (2010). After years of media 
coverage, can one more video report trigger heuristic judgments? A national study 
of American terrorism risk perceptions. Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism &  
 Brooks, R. A. (2011). Muslim “homegrown” terrorism in the United States: how serious 
is the threat? International Security, 36(2), 7-47.Political Aggression, 2(3), 163-
178. doi:10.1080/19434471003768826  
Boslaugh, S. (2007). Secondary data for public health: A practical guide. Cambridge 
University Press.  
 
105 
 
Bryneilson, J., Horndahl, A., Johansson, F., Katti, L., Martenson, C., & Svenson, P. 
(2013). Harvesting and analysis of weak signals for detecting lone wolf terrorist. 
Security Informatics, 2(11). 
 
Bryneilson, J., Horndahl, A., Johansson, F., Katti, L., Martenson, C., & Svenson, P. 
(2013). Harvesting and analysis of weak signals for detecting lone wolf terrorist. 
Security Informatics, 2(11). 
Carafano, J (2011). After Oslo: Lessons for the United States. Washington, DC: Heritage 
Foundation. Retrieved from 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/07after-oslo-attacks-lessons-for-
the-united-states 
Chermak, S., Freilich, J., & Suttmoeller, M. (2013). The organizational dynamics of far-
right hate groups in the United States: Comparing violent to nonviolent 
organizations. Studies  in Conflict & Terrorism, 36(3), 193-218. 
doi:10.1080/1057610X.2013.755912 
Christensen, C. (2004). Political victims and media focus: The killings of Laurent Kabila, 
Zoran Djindjic, Anna Lindh, and Pim Fortuyn. Journal for Crime, Conflict, and 
Media, 1(1), 23-69.  
The Central Intelligence Agency (2013). Organization Definitions of Terrorism. 
Retrieved from www. Secbrief.org 
Creswell, J.W. (2009). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods 
approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.  
106 
 
Coffey, K. (2011). The Lone Wolf-Solo Terrorism and the Challenge of Preventative 
Prosecution. Fiu L. Rev., 7, 1. 
Coaffee, J., & Rogers, P. (2008). Rebordering the city for new security challenges: from 
counter-terrorism to community resilience. Space and Polity, 12(1), 101-118. 
Coffey, S. (2011). The case for the creation of a global FBI. Central European Journal of 
International & Security Studies, 5(2), 23-56. 
Cooper, R. (2012). From big lies to the lone wolf: How social networking incubates and 
multiplies online hate and terrorism. In The Changing Forms of Incitement to 
Terrorand Violence: The Need for a New International Response. Retrieved from 
http://jcpa.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/INCITEMENT_TO_TERROR_4.pdf. 
Cox, D. G. (2009). Leaderless jihad: Terror networks in the twenty-first century. 
Parameters: U.S. Army War College, 39(3), 127-129.  
Dale, C. (2013, August). National Security Strategy: Mandates, Execution to Date, and 
Issues for Congress. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WASHINGTON DC 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE. 
Dean, G., Bell, P., & Newman, J. (2012). The dark side of social media: Review of online 
terrorism. Pakistan Journal of Criminology, 3(3), 107-126.  
DeRosa, M. (2005). Section 206. Roving Surveillance Authority under FISA. 
 Retrieved from www.Apps.Americanbar.org DiRienzo, C., & Das, J. (2012). 
 Terrorist risk and income revisited. Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism & Political 
Aggression, 4(3), 175. doi:10.1080/19434472.2011.565569  
107 
 
Downing, M., & Mayer, M. (2013). Preventing the next lone wolf terrorist attack requires 
stronger federal and state and local capabilities. Retrieved from 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/06/preventing-the-next-lone-wolf-
terrorist-attack-requires-stronger-federalstatelocal-capabilities 
Eren, S. (2007). Psychology and the mindset of suicide bombers. Suicide as a Weapon, 
30(1), 28-37.  
Federal Bureau of Investigation (2013). Operation lone wolf. Retrieved from 
http://www.fbi.gov/sandiego/about-us/history/operation-lone-wolf   
Feldman, M. (2013). Comparative lone wolf terrorism: Toward a heuristic definition. 
Democracy and security, 9(3), 270-286. 
 
Friedman, B. H., Harper, J., & Preble, C. A. (2010). Terrorizing Ourselves: Why US 
Counterterrorism Policy is Failing and How to Fix It. Cato Institute. 
Gartenstein-Ross, D. (2009). Leaderless Jihad: Terror networks in the twenty-first 
century. Middle East Quarterly, 16(3), 92-93.  
Gilly, T. (2013). The new paradigm: Terrorism policing is more than policing terrorists. 
The need for adaptive models of terrorism policing. Homeland Security Review, 
7(2), 179-226.  
Glaser, J., & Laudel, G. (2013). Life with and without coding: Two methods for early-
stage data analysis in qualitative research aiming at causal explanations. In 
Forum/Qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum: Qualitative Social Research, (14)2. 
108 
 
Gray, P. W. (2013). Leaderless resistance, networked organization, and ideological 
hegemony. Terrorism and Political Violence, 25(5), 655-671. 
Greenwald, G. (2014). No place to hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the US 
surveillance state. Macmillan. 
Gruenewald, J., Chermak, S., & Freilich, J. D. (2013). Overview of: Distinguishing loner 
attacks from other domestic extremist violence: A comparison of rar-right 
homicide incident and offender characteristics. Criminology & Public Policy, 
12(1), 63-64. doi:10.1111/1745-9133.12009  
Guterman, K. (2013). The Dynamics of Stereotyping: Is a new image of the terrorist 
evolving in American popular culture? Terrorism & Political Violence, 25(4), 
640-652. doi:10.1080/09546553.2013.814506 
Hearing on Boston bombings points to lapses in information sharing by feds, Value of 
grant funding (2013). Defense Daily International, 6. 
Herschinger, E. (2013). A battlefield of meanings: The struggle for identity in the UN 
debates on a definition of international terrorism. Terrorism & Political Violence, 
25(2), 183-201. doi:10.1080/09546553.2011.652318 
Hoffman, B. (2013). RAND corporations. Countering the new terrorism. Retrieved from 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR989.html  
Howie, L. (2012). Media and Terrorism: Global Perspectives.  
 
Horne, C. (2012). Methodological triangulation in the analysis of terrorist networks. 
 Studies In Conflict & Terrorism, 35(2), 182-192.  
109 
 
Hua, J., & Bapna, S. (2012). How can we deter cyber terrorism? Information Security 
Journal: A Global Perspective, 21(2), 102-114. doi:10.1080/19393555.2011.647250  
International Association of Chiefs of Police (2012). Rarely does an individual commit 
ideologically-motivated acts of violence in complete isolation, without having 
been influenced, directed, guided, or assisted by other violent extremists. 
Retrieved from http://www.theiacp.org/portals/0/pdfs/IACP 
COT_LoneTerrorists__FINALAug12.pdf 
Joosse, P. (2007). Leaderless resistance and ideological inclusion: The case of the Earth 
Liberation Front. Terrorism & Political Violence, 19(3), 351-368. 
doi:10.1080/09546550701424042 
Kassel, W. (2009). Terrorism and the international anarchist movement of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(3), 
237-252. doi:10.1080/10576100802671009 
King, M., & Taylor, D. M. (2011). The radicalization of homegrown jihadists: A review 
of theoretical models and social psychological evidence. Terrorism & Political 
Violence, 23(4), 602-622. doi:10.1080/09546553.2011.587064 
Klein, J. J. (2012). Deterring and dissuading nuclear terrorism. Journal of Strategic 
Security, 5(1), 15-29. doi:10.5038/1944-0472.5.1.2 
Kouri, J. (2011). Lone wolf terrorist threat increasing, say security experts. Retrieved 
from http://www.aim.org/guest-column/lone-wolf-terrorist-threat-increasing-say-
security-experts/  
110 
 
Lachlan, K. A., Spence, P. R., & Seeger, M. (2009). Terrorist attacks and uncertainty 
reduction: Media use after September 11. Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism & 
Political Aggression, 1(2), 101-110. doi:10.1080/19434470902771683 
Lammers, C. J., & Hickson, D. (Eds.). (2013). Organizations Alike and Unlike (rle: 
Organizations): International and Inter-institutional Studies in the Sociology of 
Organizations (Vol. 17). Routledge. 
Lasky, S. (2012). Al-Qaeda may be dead, but the lone wolf threat remains. Security 
Technology Executive, 22(4), 6. 
Lemieux, F., & Regens, J. L. (2012). Assessing terrorist risks: Developing an algorithm-
based model for law enforcement. Pakistan Journal of Criminology, 3(3), 33-50.  
Levitt, M. (2017). Low cost, High Impact: Combating the Financing of Lone-Wolf and 
Small Scale Terrorist Attacks.  Retrieved from www.financialservices.house.gov 
Lieber, K. A., & Press, D. G (2013). Why states won’t give nuclear weapons to terrorists. 
International Security, 38(1), 80-104. 
Lieberman, J., & Collins, S. (2011). A ticking time bomb. Hearing before the Committee 
on Armed Services, United States Senate, Washington, DC. Retrieved from 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg63686/pdf/CHRG-
111shrg63686.pdf  
Lindsay, B. R. (2011). Social media and disasters: Current uses, future options, and 
policy considerations. 
Lui, E. (2011). Congressional Research Service. Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act. Retrieved from http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R40138.pdf 
111 
 
Margulies, P. (2013). The NSA in Global Perspective: Surveillance, Human Rights, and 
International Counterterrorism. Fordham L. Rev., 82, 2137. 
Marshall, C., & Rossman, G. B. (2014). Designing Qualitative Research. Sage 
Publications. 
Martinez, J. (2012). Terrorist attacks on American soil: From the Civil War era to the 
present. Lanham, MD: Bowman & Littlefield Publications. 
Mauroni, A. (2013). Facing our fears, managing the threat. U.S. Naval Institute 
Proceedings, 139(10), 36-41. 
Mazhar, M., Khan, S., & Goraya, N. S. (2013). Understanding terrorism and the ways to 
root out: Perceptions and realities. Journal of Political Studies, 20(1), 67-82.  
McCauley, C., Moskalenko, S., and Van Son, B. (2013). Characteristics of lone-wolf 
violent offenders: A comparison of assassins and school attackers. Perspectives 
on Terrorism, 7(1). Retrieved from 
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/240/html  
McComb, J. M. (2013). Closing Pandora’s Box: The threat of terrorist use of weapons of 
mass destruction. Global Security Studies, 4(1), 71-92.  
McClure, J. (2013). Has Hamas’ progressive terrorism tactics evolved past traditional 
counterterrorism measures? An analysis of a means to an end for the terrorist 
organization hamas. Global Security Studies, 4(1), 31-37.  
McNabb, D.E (2010) Research methods in public adminstration and nonprofit 
 management: quantitative and qualitative approaches (3rd ed).  Armonk, NY: 
 M.E. Sharpe, Inc 
112 
 
Meisels, T. (2009). Defining terrorism–A typology. Critical Review of International 
Social and Political Philosophy, 12(3), 331-351. 
Mendelson, M. E. (2008). A systems understanding of terrorism with implications for 
policy (Doctoral Dissertation). Retrieved from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses, 658. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/304682845?accountid=14872.  
 Merari, A., Diamant, I., Bibi, A., Broshi, Y., & Zakin, G. (2010). Personality 
characteristics of self-martyrs/suicide bombers and/organizers of suicide attacks. 
Terrorism & Political Violence, 22(1), 87-101. doi:10.1080/09546550903409312 
Michael, G. (2012). Leaderless resistance: The new face of terrorism. Defence Studies, 
12(2), 257-282. doi:10.1080/14702436.2012.699724  
Michael, G. (2013). The new media and the rise of exhortatory terrorism. Strategic 
Studies  Quarterly, 7(1), 40-68.  
Moses, T. (2010). Being treated differently: Stigma experiences with family, peers, and 
school staff among adolescents with mental health disorders. Social science & 
medicine, 70(7), 985-993. 
Miller, P. D. (2013). The Contemporary Presidency: Organizing the National Security 
Council: I Like Ike's. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 43(3), 592-606. 
Mueller, R. (2003). War on terrorism. Testimony before the Select Committee on 
Intelligence of the United States Senate, Washington, DC. Retrieved from 
https://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2003_hr/021103mueller.html. 
Napolitano, J. (2011). Understand the Homeland Threat Landscape-Considerations for 
the 112th Congress. Testimony before the House Committee on Homeland 
113 
 
Security, Washington DC. Retrieved from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
112hhrg72212/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg72212.pdf 
National Alliance (2011). Background Information Summaries, 18.  
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). 
(2016). Global Terrorism Database. Retrieved from 
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd 
Nijboer, M. (2012). A review of lone wolf terrorism: The need for a different approach. 
Social Cosmo, 3(1), 33-39. 
Northern Arizona University (2013). Methods of data collections. Retrieved from 
 http://www.prm.nau.edu/prm447/methods_of_data_collection_lesson.htm 
O’Donnell, B., & Gray, D. H. (2012). Media and state sponsored terrorism. Global 
Security Studies, 3(2), 43-55.  
Painter, W. L. (2013). Issues in homeland security policy for the 113th Congress. 
Pajunen, C. The Lone Wolf Terrorist: Mechanisms and Triggers of a Process-Driven 
Radicalization. Retrieved from http://www.ir-ia.com/reports/IRIA-Report-Global-
Terrorism-Trend-4.pdf 
Pantucci, R. (2011). What have we learned about lone wolves from Anders Behring 
Breivik? Perspectives on Terrorism, 5(5/6), 27-42.    
Pantucci, R., Ellis, C., & Chaplais, L. (2016). Lone actor terrorism. 
Phillips, P. J. (2011). Lone wolf terrorism. Peace Economics, Peace Science, & Public 
Policy, 17(1), 1-29.  
114 
 
Perlmutter, D. (2013). Prelude to the Boston bombings. Middle East Quarterly, 20(4), 67-
77. 
Pfeiffer, C. P. (2012). Terrorism and its oxygen: A game-theoretic perspective on 
terrorism and the media. Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism & Political 
Aggression, 4(3), 212-228. doi:10.1080/19434472.2011.594629 
Political Research Associates (2013). Researching the right for progressive change 
makers. Retrieved from 
http://www.publiceye.org/liberty/terrorism/insurgency/leaderless-resistance.html 
Preble, C. (2011). Understanding the dimensions, and limits, of American power.  World 
Politics Review (19446284), 4.  
Rapin, A. (2011). What is terrorism? Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism & Political 
Aggression, 3(3), 161-175. doi:10.1080/19434472.2010.512155 
RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (2013). A RAND National Defense 
Research Institute project. Retrieved from 
http://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/terrorms-incidents.html 
Rasler, K., & Thompson, W. R. (2009). Looking for waves of terrorism. Terrorism & 
Political Violence, 21(1), 28-41. doi:10.1080/09546550802544425  
Research Methods Knowledge Database (2013). Qualitative approaches. Retrieved from 
 http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/qualapp.php 
Ritchey, D. (2013). The Power of Partnerships. Security: Solutions for Enterprise 
Security Leaders, 50(8), 16-22. 
115 
 
Rollins, J., & Wilson, C. (2007). Terrorist capabilities for cyber attack: Overview and 
policy  issues. Retrieved from http://italy.usembassy.gov/ pdf/other/RL33123.pdf 
Sagers Herzog, C. (2013). Lone wolf terrorism: Understanding the growing threat. 
Diplomatic Courier, 7(4), 64. 
Said, B. (2012). Hymns nasheeds: A contribution to the study of the jihadist culture. 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 35(12), 863-879. 
doi:10.1080/1057610X.2012.720242 
Sauter, M., & Carafano, J. (2012). Homeland Security: A Complete Guide 2/E. McGraw 
Hill Professional. 
Sedgwick, M. (2012). Jihadist ideology, Western counter-ideology, and the ABC model. 
Critical Studies on Terrorism, 5(3), 359-372. doi:10.1080/17539153.2012.723520 
Shea, D. A. (2013). Chemical agents as weapons of terror rather than as weapons of mass 
destruction. Congressional Research Service: Report, 11-12.  
Shoshani, A., & Slone, M. (2008). The drama of media coverage of terrorism: Emotional 
and attitudinal impact on the audience. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 31(7), 
627-640. doi:10.1080/10576100802144064 
Silverman, D. (ED). (2016). Qualitative Rearch. Sage. 
Simeon, J. C. (2010). Complicity and culpability and the exclusion of terrorists from 
convention refugee status post-9/11. Refugee Survey Quarterly, 29(4), 104-
137.doi:10.1093/rsq/hdq036 
Small, M.L. (2009). How many cases do I need? On science and the logic of  
 case selection in field-base research. Ethnography, 10(10, 5-38 
116 
 
Spaaij, R. (2010). The enigma of lone wolf terrorism: An assessment.   
  Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33(9), 854-870.  
Sonoma University (2013). Lecture on Phenomenology. Retrieved from 
 http://www.sonoma.edu/users/d/daniels/phenomlect.html 
Spencer, A. (2006). Questioning the concept of ‘New Terrorism’.    
  Peace, Conflict and Development, 1-33.  
Sringernyuang, L. (ND). Ethical issues in documentary and secondary analysis. Retrieved 
 from http://mu-
 irb.mahidol.ac.th/ref9/train/230355/powerpoint_%E0%B8%AD_%E0%B8%A5%
 E0%B8%B7%E0%B8%AD%E0%B8%8A%E0%B8%B1%E0%B8%A2.pdf 
Stampnitzky, L. (2013). Disciplining Terror: How Experts Invented'Terrorism'. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Stewart, S. (2011a). Oslo, Norway: Lessons learned from a successful lone-wolf attack. 
Police  one. Retrieved from 
http://www.policeone.com/terrorism/articles/4146174-Oslo-Norway-
Lessonslearned-from-a-successful-lone-wolf-attack/.  
Stewart, S. (2011b). Cutting though the lone-wolf hype. Retrieved from 
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110921-cutting-through-lone-wolf-hype 
Stump, J. L. (2013). On the future of critical terrorism studies: A response to Richard 
Jackson’s minimal foundationalist redefinition of terrorism. Behavioral Sciences 
117 
 
of Terrorism & Political Aggression, 5(3), 217-224. 
doi:10.1080/19434472.2011.629579  
Sunstein, C. R. (2008). Misery and company. New Republic, 239(7), 39-43.  
Teich, S. (2013). Trends and developments in lone wolf terrorism in the western world. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/1234/currentpage/1/Default.aspx 
The University of Buffalo (2013). The legal aftermath of the assassination of William 
McKinley. Retrieved from http://library.buffalo.edu/pan-am/exposition/law/  
South Alabama University. Twelve major characteristics of a qualitative study. Retrieved 
 from http://www.southalabama.edu/coe/bset/johnson/lectures/lec12.htm 
Tikuisis, P. (2009). On the relationship between weak states and terrorism. Behavioral 
Sciences of Terrorism & Political Aggression, 1(1), 66-79. 
doi:10.1080/19434470802482175 
Transnational Terrorism, Security, and the Rule of Law (2008). Radicalization, 
recruitment, and the EU counter-radicalization strategy. Brussels: European 
Commission Sixth Framework Program. 
Tucker, D. (2010). Jihad dramatically transformed? Sageman on jihad and the internet. 
Homeland Security Affairs, 6(1), 1-7.  
Turchie, T., & Puckett, K. (2007). Hunting the American terrorist: The FBI’s war on 
homegrown terror. Palisades, NY: History Publishing.  
Unites States., & Obama, R. (2013). National security strategy of the United States: the 
Whitehouse.  
118 
 
University of Connecticut (2013). NVivo. SLG software licensing group. Retrieved from 
 http://software.uconn.edu/software/software_detail.php?softid=nvivo 
Valentin-Bogdan, D. Ă. N. I. L. Ă. (2013). RISKS AND THREATS RECOGNIZED IN 
 THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT. Scientific Research & Education in the Air 
 Force-AFASES, 1. 
Vartanian, T.P. (2011). Secondary data analysis. New York, NY: Oxford 
Van Gelder, J. (2013). Beyond rational choice: The hot/cool perspective of criminal 
decision making. Psychology, Crime & Law, 19(9), 745-763. 
doi:10.1080/1068316X.2012.660153 
Victoroff, J., Adelamn, J., & Stern, N. (2006). Sympathy for terrorism: Possible 
interaction between social, emotional, and neuroendocrine risk factors. Tangled 
Roots: Social & Psychological Factors in The Genesis of Terrorism, 11(1), 227-
234.  
Waugh, M. H. (2006). Understand terror networks. Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations, 
6(1), 137-139. doi:10.1300/J173v06n01_10  
White, S. I. (2010). Moving from mindset to outcome. Journal of Counterterrorism & 
Homeland Security International, 16(3), 48-51 
119 
 
Appendix A: Central Research Question and Subquestions 
Central research question: What are the underlying mechanisms and processes that lead 
individuals to be drawn to or away from an existing radical movement and to act 
unilaterally and without direction to violent ends?  
Theme: In brief, the three individual-level underlying mechanisms and processes that 
lead individuals to be drawn to or away from an existing radical movement and to act 
unilaterally and without direction to violent ends are: Personal and political grievances, 
Risk and status seeking, and unfreezing.  
Sub question 1: What causes an individual to participate in lone wolf terrorism?  
Theme: First, the phenomenon of the domestic lone wolf terrorist is not limited in extent 
to a particular type of movement. Rather lone terrorist operate on the fringes of extremist 
movements, with such loose associations being connected to right-wing ideologies, 
inspired and fascinated by Islamic ideologies of Arabian Peninsula and The Islamic State 
of Iraq (AQAP) and Levant (ISIL), and self-developed ideologies facilitating violence 
based on political, religious, or social change. 
Sub question 2: Are there consistent and significant indicators that can characterize a 
potential lone wolf actor?  
Theme: In characterizing the lone wolf terrorist, there are several indicators: gender, 
internet, radical expressions, pseudo spontaneous communication, and identification.  
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Appendix B: Terms and Defintions 
Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula- is a militant Islamist organization. 
Anarchists- generally oppose “illegitimate authority”. 
Animal Liberation Front- is an international, clandestine leaderless resistance that 
engages in direct action in pursuit of animal rights. 
Anti-abortion extremists- individuals or groups who believe abortion is unethical and 
that violence is justified against people and establishments providing abortion services. 
Anti-government extremists- refer to any fringe movement with an antipathy towards 
government. 
Anti-gun control extremists- individuals that see any restriction on the manufacture, 
ownership, or use of firearms infringes this sacred right. 
Anti-Israeli- against Israel. 
Anti-Kim Jong- against King Jong. 
Anti-liberal Extremists- believe the United States of America is a Christian country that 
its people are Christian, and that government reflect its beliefs and values and oppose all 
effort to deny or weaken Christian heritage. 
Anti-Muslim Extremists- the threat of infiltration of Sharia, or Islamic law, into the U.S. 
court systems. 
Anti-Police Extremists- opposed to or against the police. 
Anti-Semitic- refers to hostile or prejudice against Jews because of their religion and/or 
ethnicity.  
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Anti-Sikh Extremists- individuals who mistaken Sikhism’s for Islam and believes 
violence is justified 
Anti-Trump Extremists- against President Trump. 
Anti-white Extremists- against white supremacy. 
Courtroom Extremists- against the court system. 
Earth Liberation Front- uses “economic” sabotage and guerilla warfare to stop the 
destruction of the environment.  
Fixation- obsessed with a person or cause. 
Gender- Male or Female 
Identification- willingness of the attacker to commit violence as an agent of a particular 
belief system. 
Internet- makes it easier for would be lone wolf terrorist to uncover ideologies and 
associations supporting their belief systems, and for them to share their intentions and 
actions with via social media.  
Jihadi-inspired extremists- refer to Islamic extremism occurring within the United 
States.  
Minuteman American Defense-is a volunteer group headed by Chris Simox and 
dedicated to preventing illegal crossings of the United States border.  
Muslim extremist- any form of Islam that opposes “democracy”, the rule of law, 
individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. 
NEO-Nazi-extremists- share a hatred for Jews and love for Adolf Hitler.  
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Personal and Political grievance- Individual radicalization usually occurs with a 
blending of personal and group grievance, a blending in which personal grievance means 
hostility or negative identification with a group seen as perpetrators of injustice, and 
group grievance means positive identification with a group seen as the victims of 
injustice. 
ProLGBT- extremists- Those who promote homosexuality and same sex marriage. 
Pseudo spontaneous communication-involves the intentional and strategic 
manipulation of some formal displays. 
Radical expressions- are used in postings to vent grievances. 
Right-wing extremists- encompass individuals or groups associated with white 
supremacist, anti-government, sovereign citizen, militia, or other ideologies that target 
specific religious, ethnic, or other minority groups. 
Risk and status seeking- Inspired and/or fascinated by the teachings of Anwar Awlaki’s, 
Abu Muhammad al Adnani, and or Osama bin Laden under Al’Qaida in the Arabian 
Peninsula or The Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) for whom violence may seem 
the best path respect. 
Soveign Citizens- is a loose grouping of American litigants, commentators, tax 
protesters, and financial-scheme promoters. 
Unfreezing- Unfreezing is a personal crisis such as a mental disorder or illness in 
disconnection that leaves an individual with less to lose and in search of new directions 
White extremists- the belief that white people are superior to those of all other races. 
Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) - is a force multiplier of Al Qaida. 
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Unknown- bleak to no identity at all. 
Veterans for non-religious memorials- individuals or groups that will stop at nothing to 
intimidate communities to tear down veterans memorials. 
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This email is to notify you that the Institutional Review Board (IRB) confirms that your 
doctoral capstone entitled, “Leaderless Resistance: The Manifestation of Lone Wolves in 
the U.S.” meets Walden University’s ethical standards. Since this project will serve as a 
Walden doctoral capstone, the Walden IRB will oversee your capstone data analysis and 
results reporting. Your IRB approval number is 06-13-17-0307965.  
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approval by submitting the IRB Request for Change in Procedures Form. You will 
receive confirmation with a status update of the request within 10 business days of 
submitting the change request form and are not permitted to implement changes prior to 
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procedures related to ethical standards in research. 
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